
## No IT Security without Free Software

How Openness Contributes to IT Security








US NUCLEAR CHAIN OF COMMAND





US NUCLEAR CHAIN OF COMMAND



#### **Free Software**

#### Use

Software can be used for any purpose, without restrictions



#### **Study**

Software can be analysed by everyone. The source code is available

#### Share

Software can be shared freely with anyone, without limitations




Software can be modified by everyone, for the better or the worse



"There might be areas that we see as too critical for whatever reason to publish, usually related to cyber security."

- Thomas Gageik, European Commission





## Flaws of Security by Obscurity

- Secrecy itself is no sufficient protection
  - Human factor (stupidity, betrayers)
  - Brute-force
- Many examples in IT
  - Windows
  - Citrix
  - Meltdown, Spectre...



## Kerckhoffs's Principle



"[A cipher] should not require secrecy, and it should not be a problem if it falls into enemy hands"

- Auguste Kerckhoffs, 1883










# CYBER CYBER SECURITY





## IT Security as a Process

Obvious
Code flaws

Encryption

Fixing bugs

Oh...

Dependencies

Human factor

Customisation

3


...my gosh

Business strategy Support cycles

Liability



#### Free Software as a Solution?





## **Security Benefits by Free Software**

#### **Transparency**

Independent security audits increase trust, externally and internally

#### **Synergy**

Other users and the community take interest and can contribute




#### **Code Quality**

Better take a closer look before publishing code, and follow best practices

#### Independence

Issues can be solved on one's own. Forking possible if necessary





## Challenges



#### Responsibilities

Who takes care of security, especially in shared projects?



#### **Dependencies**

How many external components can be handled?



#### **Threats**

Can you make yourself vulnerable by "too much" openness?



#### Resources

Critical components are often underfinanced. How to handle that?

#### **Our Demands**

- Free Software for critical infrastructure
  - Trust, transparency, accountability
- Public Money → Public Code
  - High priority for digital sovereignty
- More sense of responsibility by companies and states regarding Free Software components



## **Thank you! Questions?**



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