Detecting Phishing using Visual Similarity

TALOS

Previously:

zscaler

CISCO Umbrella

OpenDNS

MANDIANT

NASA

Detecting Phishing using Visual Similarity

Outline

- Current Tools & Techniques
- Web Crawling
- Creating Datasets
- Distance & Similarity
- Grouping Images
- Testing Detection
- Beyond Images
  - HTML Similarity
  - Scraping Text from Images
  - Text Classification with LLMs
- Research
- Alerting
- Action

If you see text like this, it's a note for this pdf version of the slides so you don't have to guess what's going on.
If you see my face next to the text, it's just me "saying" the note so you can easily differentiate from other text on a busy slide.

Current Tools & Techniques

Services

URLScan.io

Crawling

Threat detection

URLScan takes screenshots and provides information on websites.
There is a YARA search that can be setup for certain kinds of website behavior





It doesn’t always succeed at the screenshots
And it doesn’t do extensive analysis on the screenshots

urlscan.io Phishing URL Feed

urlscan.io detects thousands of suspicious, malicious and phishing URLs every day. Our organic phishing URL detection is able to pinpoint these attacks and associate them with one of the 680+ popular brands that we track. The feed of these detected URLs is available to our customers to ingest

URLScan has a phishing feed that's useful. In our line of work, we all likely ingest feeds from various locations as a quick way to use the intelligence and work of others to improve our security. These feeds can also be used to gather data about the current threat landscape.

- IP address & GeoIP information of the IP hosting the phishing page
- ASN and ASN Name hosting the phishing URL

You can download a static 7-day sample of the feed here:

Download JSON Sample | Download CSV Sample

Phishing URL Feed

> 1500 detected URLs / day
> 680+ brands tracked
✔ Live URL retrieval
✔ Commercial use
✔ JSON & CSV format

Targeted Brand Information
Brand name
Brand country & industry vertical

Phishing Page Information
Phishing page metadata
Phishing domain metadata
Phishing IP metadata

Current Tools & Techniques

Detection Methods

Threat hunting
User reporting
Various Products

Threat Hunting

Compromised Infrastructure

```
<iframe src="http://far.IAAS.NEWS/?biw=OMITTEDURI" width="263" height=
"257"></iframe>
```

```
hXXp://www.fullcircleliterary.com/
hXXp://danielpsheehan.com/areas-of-
expertise/educator/ucsc-2016-rulers-
of-the-realm
hXXp://danielpsheehan.com/
hXXp://www.cafemuseroyaloak.com/
hXXp://kdsross.com/about-us/
hXXp://usdiagnostics.com/index.php/
certification-testing/uscreen-cup
hXXp://psychologywiththal.com/
2015/09/30/life-span-development-
personality/
hXXp://
thefecaltransplantfoundation.org/
what-is-fecal-transplant/
hXXp://optimalwellnessaz.com/about/
hXXp://optimalwellnessaz.com/about/
hXXp://chworks.org/real-estate-
```

C2



Phishing



Threat Hunting cont...

DNS





URL Analysis



Current Tools & Techniques

User reporting is another source of malicious activity detection

User Reporting



And there are multiple products you can pay for to increase detection

Products




Security Is Made of Layers
Various Products
Phishing Tests
The work I’m demonstrating are part of a layered approach.
There’s always room for more layers to improve security
User Reports
Egress Analysis

What do we have to do?

Crawl Websites
Take Screenshots
Build Datasets
Find Similar in…

- **Images**
- **HTML**
- **Text**
- **Infrastructure**

Web Crawling

Crawler Architecture

Send URLs

to Selenium

and take screenshots

```
● → Detect Phishing with Similarity Searching python url_crawlerv2.py urls.txt
  SUCCESS: https://pyosec.com
  SUCCESS: https://google.com
  SUCCESS: facebook.com
  Results saved to output_20240828_2315/results.html
○ → Detect Phishing with Similarity Searching
```

Demo of three websites being crawled, after which, I am left with the screenshots and a results.html file

output_20240828_2315

Name	Date Modified	Size	Kind
facebook.com.jpg	Today at 23:15	14 KB	JPEG image
google.com.jpg	Today at 23:15	15 KB	JPEG image
pyosec.com.jpg	Today at 23:15	22 KB	JPEG image
results.html	Today at 23:15	603 bytes	HTML text



Screenshots

URLs

Status

This is the start of collecting crawling data, but it will increase/improve through the presentation

Thumbnail	URL	Status
Failed to generate thumbnail	https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/e/2PACX-1vQzmTfShxetobThZx9gY00VgL-gXRC9gFeU_6RLdkIj1LXKN3UTNWNtwYDlx5OQD9xTj378VsXZiErM/pub/?start=false&loop=false&delayms=3000	Failed
Failed to generate thumbnail	https://taplink.cc/ahhdtttt/	Failed
	http://avionhealthcare.in/	Success
	http://paramojuntplus.com/	Success
Thumbnail	https://urk	Success
Failed to generate thumbnail	https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/e/2PACX-1vRSrJlzvElfXLuaw5hXN1bLC0zWfF7d5-k_408_eZJxvTGmsdU7BRpig_Vb_vW3f8qHKkDJlRJondk6/pub/?start=false&loop=false&delayms=3000&slide=id.p%3E	Failed
Failed to generate thumbnail	https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/e/2PACX-1vR1rwYJjTCFYDvYy8kVg9R1fBH1jg6SDbZHT4ZPSlnJ9OCVCsNNj2uc7IzlpgaktqB8vADFTqHW3Iwf/pub/?start=false&loop=false&delayms=3000	Failed
	http://ayurvationhealthcare.org/	Success
Thumbnail	http://gentleskinhealthllc.org/	Success
Failed to generate thumbnail	https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/e/2PACX-1vR3V6FwlkStTwTGj_qT89ZrQY6VN_Ow4uUMf8gpeMQLXMGdZ8SmHY1MbiLA0LLKxoAcONa6JdoC12Sv/pub/?start=false&loop=false&delayms=3000&slide=id.p%3E	Failed
Failed to generate thumbnail	https://foodblogspottingeleberate.blogspot.com/?m=1	Failed
Failed to generate thumbnail	https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/e/2PACX-1vSuWITrMvwpFAiW3Jyqs_DisVlUP1BH62mBJkFHTCFzbZv0Afb4dQnD5ooWFOy3i1ASsZ1ZjOJnHmvJ/pub/?start=false&loop=false&delayms=3000	Failed
Failed to generate thumbnail	http://ancient-thunder-0448.chinnabhai944.workers.dev/personalization/cl2/freeform/websitedetect/?source=wwwhead&fetchtype=css&modalview=nmlanding	Failed
Failed to generate thumbnail	https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/e/2PACX-1vSbzx_-G6NM9PvAnaXR-G_STx-EQ6mcoAa9CJ4VeD6_G4YAQzTBbUM7fBKK31Cev8ZtGipLO8tzTsPt/pub/?start=false&loop=false&delayms=3000&slide=id.p	Failed
Failed to generate thumbnail	https://enews.classicfirearms.com/q/bh-yefdf-1KDwz0X30bk7wbN8xBQdmmgRdcZcOJcmVwb3J0LcGhpc2hpbmdAYW50aXBoaXNoaW5nLm9yZ8OICri-Y8SAcL_YktPQzcdBxQqxtg/	Failed
Thumbnail	http://consciousbealthcafe.com/	Success

What it looks like when sending a large list of URLs

Issues/Obstacles when Crawling

Crawl errors

Failed to generate thumbnail errors…

Thumbnail	http://gentleskinhealthllc.org/
Failed to generate thumbnail	https://docs.google.com/presentati start=false&loop=false&delayms=
Failed to generate thumbnail	https://foodblogspottingelcberate.b
Failed to generate thumbnail	https://docs.google.com/presentati
Failed to generate thumbnail	http://ancient-thunder-0448.chinna
Failed to generate thumbnail	https://docs.google.com/presentati
Failed to generate thumbnail	https://enews.classicfirearms.com/
Thumbnail	http://conscioushealthcafe.com/

Thumbnail	URL	Status
Thumbnail	http://gentleskinhealthllc.org/	Success
Thumbnail	http://conscioushealthcafe.com/	Success

Was able to crawl, but no screenshot generated…

The crawlers run headless selenium and can be modified easily

Fixed with more info

Thumbnail	URL	Status	HTTP Status Code
	hotmail-105506.weeblysite.com	Success	200
	jpyorre.com	Success	200
Failed to generate thumbnail	emapdiwhf7.nnnn.eu.org	Failed	none
	web3autofix.pages.dev	Success	200

Stopped at Error

Thumbnail	URL	Status	HTTP Status Code
	hotmail-105506.weeblysite.com	Success	200
	jpyorre.com	Success	200
	web3autofix.pages.dev	Success	200

Other page crawling errors. A human would click, but the crawler stops

Use Selenium

Read Text



Click through

PROFIT!

Thumbnail	URL	Status	HTTP Status C
Cisco Umbrella	hotmail-105506.weeblysite.com	Success	200
	jpyorre.com	Success	200
Cisco Umbrella	web3autofix.pages.dev	Success	200

Tell Selenium to click as if it were a human…

And then realize the privacy error was because of your own protection

URL

hotmail-105506.weebly

jpyorre.com

Bypass Security



You can’t run the crawlers on a network where you are running your threat mitigations

Build a System and use custom DNS



In my case, I built a VM with custom networking and DNS to bypass my security



Now it’s working…I can visit bad locations

Use Selenium

Read Text



Click through

PROFIT!

…possibly for real this time

Thumbnail	URL	Status	HTTP Status Code
	jpyorrc.com	Success	200
	hotmail-105506.weeblysite.com	Success	200
	web3autofix.pages.dev	Success	200

Users > jpyorre > DATA > Speaking_writing > Detect Phishing with Similarity Searching > GITLAB > detecting-phishing-with-similarity-searching > webcrawler > multi_

```
48  class Webdriver(object):
124     def handle_insecure_connection(self):
126         try:
131             if warning_present:
139                 time.sleep(1)  # Sleep only after performing this action
140
141                 # Click on 'Proceed to site' link if it's clickable
142                 proceed_link = WebDriverWait(self.driver, 3).until(
143                     EC.element_to_be_clickable((By.ID, "proceed-link"))
144                 )
145                 proceed_link.click()
146                 print("Clicked through the warning.")
147                 time.sleep(1)  # Sleep only after proceeding
148
149         except Exception as e:
150             print(f"No 'Your connection is not private' warning detected or unable to find elements: {e}")
151
152     def handle_dangerous_site_warning(self):
153         """Handle 'Dangerous site' warning (phishing, malware, etc.)."""
```

Some of the code showing that you can look for any text and tell selenium to click the link.

```
160                 print("Detected 'Dangerous site' warning.")
161
162                 # Click on 'Details' button if it's clickable
163                 details_button = WebDriverWait(self.driver, 3).until(
164                     EC.element_to_be_clickable((By.ID, "details-button"))
165                 )
166                 details_button.click()
167                 time.sleep(1)  # Sleep only after performing this action
168
169                 # Click on 'this unsafe site' link if it's clickable
170                 unsafe_link = WebDriverWait(self.driver, 3).until(
171                     EC.element_to_be_clickable((By.XPATH, "//a[contains(text(), 'this unsafe site')]"))
172                 )
173                 unsafe_link.click()
174                 print("Clicked through the 'Dangerous site' warning.")
175                 time.sleep(1)  # Sleep only after proceeding
176
177         except Exception as e:
178             print(f"No 'Dangerous site' warning detected or unable to find elements: {e}")
179
180     def handle_dismiss_warning(self):
181         """Handle 'Dismiss this warning and enter site'."""
182         try:
183             # Check if the "Dismiss this warning and enter site" button is present
184             dismiss_button = WebDriverWait(self.driver, 3).until(
185                 EC.element_to_be_clickable((By.XPATH, "//button[contains(text(), 'Dismiss this warning and enter site')]"))
```

Launchpad ⊗ 0 ⚠ 0 0

You end up going from the left side results to the right side results when crawling





Another issue is dealing with captchas

Stopped at Captcha

There are multiple products that make captcha problems easier to solve. I didn't use them in this presentation (they cost money)





Demonstrating how crawling is slow
You have to go to each page to get the screenshot and other data

Crawl Speed

To speed things up, I run about 20 docker-based crawlers at once, on one VM

```
josh@athena:~/multi_selenium-as-a-service-docker$ docker-compose ps
                    Name                                  Command              State                    Ports
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1a01a7abf2e4_multi_selenium-as-a-service-docker_chrome_1   /opt/bin/entry_point.sh   Exit 143
multi_selenium-as-a-service-docker_api_1                   flask run                 Up           0.0.0.0:5002->5000/tcp,:::5002->5000/tcp
multi_selenium-as-a-service-docker_api_10                  flask run                 Up           0.0.0.0:5015->5000/tcp,:::5015->5000/tcp
multi_selenium-as-a-service-docker_api_11                  flask run                 Up           0.0.0.0:5004->5000/tcp,:::5004->5000/tcp
multi_selenium-as-a-service-docker_api_12                  flask run                 Up           0.0.0.0:5008->5000/tcp,:::5008->5000/tcp
multi_selenium-as-a-service-docker_api_13                  flask run                 Up           0.0.0.0:5019->5000/tcp,:::5019->5000/tcp
multi_selenium-as-a-service-docker_api_14                  flask run                 Up           0.0.0.0:5007->5000/tcp,:::5007->5000/tcp
multi_selenium-as-a-service-docker_api_15                  flask run                 Up           0.0.0.0:5012->5000/tcp,:::5012->5000/tcp
multi_selenium-as-a-service-docker_api_16                  flask run                 Up           0.0.0.0:5014->5000/tcp,:::5014->5000/tcp
multi_selenium-as-a-service-docker_api_17                  flask run                 Up           0.0.0.0:5013->5000/tcp,:::5013->5000/tcp
multi_selenium-as-a-service-docker_api_18                  flask run                 Up           0.0.0.0:5018->5000/tcp,:::5018->5000/tcp
multi_selenium-as-a-service-docker_api_19                  flask run                 Up           0.0.0.0:5001->5000/tcp,:::5001->5000/tcp
multi_selenium-as-a-service-docker_api_2                   flask run                 Up           0.0.0.0:5009->5000/tcp,:::5009->5000/tcp
multi_selenium-as-a-service-docker_api_20                  flask run                 Up           0.0.0.0:5010->5000/tcp,:::5010->5000/tcp
multi_selenium-as-a-service-docker_api_3                   flask run                 Up           0.0.0.0:5005->5000/tcp,:::5005->5000/tcp
multi_selenium-as-a-service-docker_api_4                   flask run                 Up           0.0.0.0:5016->5000/tcp,:::5016->5000/tcp
multi_selenium-as-a-service-docker_api_5                   flask run                 Up           0.0.0.0:5006->5000/tcp,:::5006->5000/tcp
multi_selenium-as-a-service-docker_api_6                   flask run                 Up           0.0.0.0:5011->5000/tcp,:::5011->5000/tcp
multi_selenium-as-a-service-docker_api_7                   flask run                 Up           0.0.0.0:5017->5000/tcp,:::5017->5000/tcp
multi_selenium-as-a-service-docker_api_8                   flask run                 Up           0.0.0.0:5003->5000/tcp,:::5003->5000/tcp
multi_selenium-as-a-service-docker_api_9                   flask run                 Up           0.0.0.0:5000->5000/tcp,:::5000->5000/tcp
multi_selenium-as-a-service-docker_hub_1                   /opt/bin/entry_point.sh   Up (healthy)   4442/tcp, 4443/tcp, 0.0.0.0:4444->4444/tcp,
```

```
→  Detect Phishing with Similarity Searching python url_crawler_multi.py 100.txt

processing docs.google.com/presentation/d/e/2PACX-1vQzmTfShxetobTbZx9gY00VgL-gXRC9gFeU_6RLdklj1L
XKN3UTNWNtwYDlx5OQD9xTj378VsXZiErM/pub/?start=false&amp;loop=false&

processing docs.google.com/presentation/d/e/2PACX-1vRSrJlzvElfXLuaw
GmsdU7BRpig_Vb_vW3f8qHKkDJlRJondk6/pub/?start=false&loop=false&dela
processing foodblogspottingeleberate.blogspot.com/?m=1
processing consciousheathcafe.com



processing synongmei.com
FAIL: https://foodblogspottingeleberate.blogspot.com/?m=1
FAIL: https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/e/2PACX-1vRSrJlzvElfXLuaw5hXN1bLC0zWfF7d5-k_408_eZJ
xvTGmsdU7BRpig_Vb_vW3f8qHKkDJlRJondk6/pub/?start=false&loop=false&delayms=3000&slide=id.p%3E
FAIL: https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/e/2PACX-1vQzmTfShxetobTbZx9gY00VgL-gXRC9gFeU_6RLdkl
j1LXKN3UTNWNtwYDlx5OQD9xTj378VsXZiErM/pub/?start=false&amp;loop=false&amp;delayms=3000

processing functionhealth.health

processing www.jmggldu.cn
processing riversonhealthcare.com

SUCCESS: http://consciousheathcafe.com/

processing urxedz.com
SUCCESS: http://synongmei.com/

processing docs.google.com/presentation/d/e/2PACX-1vRJYinXYdCv27wNesZVRZP7bLtRVaqpOF35GS5_J39UbM
ntCRipPiPYU-ionpIQgY6nXRbhnIO6d5r1/pub/?start=false&amp;loop=false&amp;delayms=3000
SUCCESS: http://www.jmggldu.cn/

processing www.xqngaxb.cn
SUCCESS: http://riversonhealthcare.com/

processing docs.google.com/presentation/d/e/2PACX-1vQy7F2ND-wQoupdi4XS3EtuSBWFNB6q81nnzCI0pq7Mhj
h4V3mYu75aTizYZfCduUXlpx-FHlU6E6do/pub/?start=false&amp;loop=false&amp;delayms=3000
FAIL: https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/e/2PACX-1vRJYinXYdCv27wNesZVRZP7bLtRVaqpOF35GS5_J39
UbMntCRipPiPYU-ionpIQgY6nXRbhnIO6d5r1/pub/?start=false&amp;loop=false&amp;delayms=3000

processing usps.an-com.top
SUCCESS: http://functionhealth.health/

processing beaconhealthrecruiting.com
SUCCESS: https://urxedz.com/

processing docs.google.com/presentation/d/e/2PACX-1vQWW58QcaY7k6F70UvD3gsWmD6zwrBJbSlbX8_kUEj0qk
PeAO8UF5wJoRzizMY3UiLwwNJC4iWkk39s/pub/?start=false&amp;loop=false&amp;delayms=3000
FAIL: https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/e/2PACX-1vQy7F2ND-wQoupdi4XS3EtuSBWFNB6q81nnzCI0pq7
Mhjh4V3mYu75aTizYZfCduUXlpx-FHlU6E6do/pub/?start=false&amp;loop=false&amp;delayms=3000

processing 2igvd.des4.com.tr
SUCCESS: https://www.xqngaxb.cn/

processing championhealth.co
```

It doesn’t use much of the VMs resources







1 VM with 20 crawlers is not enough. I want them all over, but where?

But it's not enough. I want

Even More Crawlers!

In the right places

Where is the best place to put my crawlers?

Crawler Distribution

As an example, I took the phishtank dataset:
I collected ‘all online and verified’ phishes, got the domain out of the URL,
and looked up the A record of the domain.

Then, I get the latitude and longitude of the IP.


```
{'description': 'Unknown City, United States (Domain: q-r.to)',
 'lat': 37.751,
 'lon': -97.822},
{'description': 'Kansas City, United States (Domain: replit.app)',
 'lat': 39.1027,
 'lon': -94.5778},
{'description': 'Unknown City, United States (Domain: '
                'firebaseapp.com)',
 'lat': 37.751,
 'lon': 103.8503},
{'description': 'Unknown City, United States (Domain: '
                'google.com)',
 'lat': 37.751,
 'lon': -97.822},
{'description': 'Boardman, United States (Domain: ngrok.app)',
 'lat': 45.8234,
 'lon': -119.7257},
{'description': 'Unknown City, France (Domain: ovh.ca)',
 'lat': 48.8582,
 'lon': 2.3387},
{'description': 'Unknown City, Australia (Domain: dreamwp.com)',
 'lat': -33.494,
 'lon': 143.2104},
{'description': 'Singapore, Singapore (Domain: grefghdf.com)',
 'lat': 1.2868,
```



And I map those locations (this is in the code at the end)



And get statistics on where most of the domains hosting phishing URLs are located

USA in the lead… *(cries.jpg)*

- United States: 2813 URLs
- Germany: 27 URLs
- Hong Kong: 25 URLs
- Russia: 16 URLs
- France: 15 URLs
- The Netherlands: 13 URLs
- Brazil: 13 URLs
- United Kingdom: 11 URLs
- Japan: 9 URLs
- Canada: 9 URLs
- Australia: 8 URLs
- India: 7 URLs
- Indonesia: 6 URLs
- Poland: 5 URLs
- Spain: 5 URLs
- Italy: 5 URLs
- Singapore: 4 URLs
- Türkiye: 4 URLs
- South Africa: 4 URLs
- Bangladesh: 4 URLs
- Thailand: 4 URLs
- Czechia: 4 URLs
- Mauritius: 3 URLs
- Malaysia: 3 URLs
- Argentina: 3 URLs
- China: 3 URLs
- Finland: 3 URLs
- Bulgaria: 2 URLs
- Taiwan: 2 URLs
- Iran: 2 URLs
- Vietnam: 2 URLs
- Belgium: 2 URLs
- Portugal: 2 URLs
- Nepal: 1 URLs
- Slovakia: 1 URLs
- Peru: 1 URLs
- Switzerland: 1 URLs
- South Korea: 1 URLs
- British Virgin Islands: 1 URLs
- Ukraine: 1 URLs
- Hungary: 1 URLs


Quick sidebar about staying hidden as a threat hunter
Just a quick note
Staying hidden?

America's Cyber Defense Agency

NATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AND RESILIENCE

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Generally, you don't want to touch systems from locations that can be attributed to you or your organization.

ALERT

Threat Actors Targeting Cybersecurity Researchers

Last Revised: April 14, 2021

Google and Microsoft recently published reports on advanced persistent threat (APT) actors targeting cybersecurity researchers. The APT actors are using fake social media profiles and legitimate-looking websites to lure security researchers into visiting malicious websites to steal information, including exploits and zero-day vulnerabilities. APT groups often use elaborate social engineering and spear phishing schemes to trick victims into running malicious code through malicious links and websites.

There are services that provide access to distributed proxies that you can use for crawling



They cost money (I didn't use them for this presentation)



Your own Proxy

Privoxy - Home Page

Privoxy is a non-caching web proxy with advanced fil
controlling access, and removing ads and other obnoxious Internet junk. Privoxy has a flexible configuration and can be customized to suit individual needs and tastes. It has application for both stand-alone systems and multi-user networks.

Privoxy is Free Software and licensed under the GNU GPLv2 or later.

Privoxy is an associated project of Software in the Public Interest (SPI).

Helping hands and donations are welcome:

- https://www.privoxy.org/participate
- https://www.privoxy.org/donate

The most recent release is 3.0.34 (stable).

But I did set up my own proxies in various networks

Docker-Compose

```
privoxy:
  build:
    context: ./privoxydocker
  container_name: privoxy
  restart: always
  volumes:
    - ./privoxydocker/logs/privoxy:/var/log/privoxy
    - ./privoxydocker/privoxy.conf:/etc/privoxy/config:ro
  ports:
    - "1080:1080"
  dns:
    - 192.168.1.5
    - 192.168.1.3
```

Now that crawling is more or less sorted,
let's move onto creating the malicious dataset
that will be used to compare unknown URLs against.

Creating Datasets

Building a Malicious Dataset

Data Sources

Some are better than others

URLhaus

Community Sourced

Malware Activity

There are lots of datasources. You can use your own corpus of known-bad URLs, or you can use free services (or you can pay for feeds).
This example shows using URLHaus





You can often grab a CSV, json, or other file with URLs



generate thumbnail	http://p6.zbjimg.com/task/2010-12/03/519808/4cf8

Total Bandwidth Used: 0.02 KB

Some feeds are better than others for this purpose.
urlhaus feed is a malware feed - there aren't really websites to crawl here.

Summary of HTTP Status Codes

- HTTP 404: 9405 occurrences
- HTTP 200: 4 occurrences

This is a malware feed

Other feeds are better, such as urlscan.io and phishintank phishing feeds

URLScan.io



Once you have your list of URLs and you've crawled them to get screenshots, you may notice that a lot of screenshots are not worthy of being used as malicious screenshot to compare other screenshots to. At this point, you have to go through the screenshots, removing anything that doesn't apply.

Removing non-relevant



In this example of screenshots, some are good for a malicious dataset, but you can see that others aren't so great.

To quickly remove screenshots that won’t work, I will introduce some of the main ideas behind locating similar screenshots. The information in this portion of the presentation will be used in various ways throughout the many different similarity analysis Techniques.

Distance & Similarity

The primary algorithm and technique behind all similarity detection is Levenshtein. I'll be demonstrating using it as well as various hashing comparison mechanisms that use it under the hood of their own processes.

Levenshtein Distance

Levenshtein is used best on short strings of text.
In this example, how many changes to you need to make to turn the word ‘bats’ into the word ‘cats’. It’s just one letter, so this would be a Levenshtein distance of 1

Levenshtein Distance of 1



If you take a very long string, you will get a much larger Levenshtein distance.

Stay signed in
Forgot username?
Create an account
Yahoo makes it easy to enjoy what matters most in your world.
Best in class Yahoo Mail, breaking local, national and global news, finance, sports, music, movies and more
Enter password to finish sign in
Password Next
TermsPrivacy
x
Yahoo works best with the latest versions of the browsers. You're using an outdated or unsupported browse
browser version now.
More Info

Levenshtein Distance of 717



Processing file: ./009-288-49.weeblysite.com.txt
Home | 009-288-49
Shopping Cart
You don't have any items in your cart.
Checkout
Continue Shopping
Accepted here
Sign into access AT&T Mail andCurrently.com
This form is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
Sign in
Back to Cart
009-288-49
Secure checkout by Square

If you take a shorter string, like these two URLs, you get a smaller one

http://61.52.12.185:54720/bin.sh

Online (spreading malware for 14 minutes)

61.52.12.185

2024-10-21 05:56:05 UTC

Malware download

http://61.52.12.185:54720/bin.sh

Levenshtein Distance of 14

http://61.52.95.103:33803/i

Online (spreading malware for 16 minutes)

61.52.95.103

2024-10-21 05:54:06 UTC

Malware download

http://61.52.95.103:33803/i

Before continuing with Levenshtein, I want to talk about a hashing algorithm designed for images called PHASH, then we will apply Levenshtein to it.



pHash

The open source perceptual hash library

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What is a perceptual hash?

A perceptual hash is a fingerprint of a multimedia file derived from various features from its content. Unlike cryptographic hash functions which rely on the avalanche effect of small changes in input leading to drastic changes in the output, perceptual hashes are "close" to one another if the features are similar.

Relevance of Perceptual Hashing

Perceptual hashes must be robust enough to take into account transformations or "attacks" on a given input and yet be flexible enough to distinguish between dissimilar files. Such attacks can include rotation, skew, contrast adjustment and different compression/formats. All of these challenges make perceptual hashing an interesting field of study and at the forefront of computer science research.

News and Updates:

04.23.2013 pHash 0.9.6 released. Fix some compilation errors and warnings, as well as updates to the automake files to support building on Gentoo.

11.23.2012 pHash 0.9.5 released. Fix compilation problem with using deprecated FFmpeg functions.

10.20.2011 **Cumulix 1.0** Cumulix is an extremely fast and scalable cloud-based image search and retrieval system based on pHash Pro and Neo4j.

What is pHash?

pHash is an open source software library released under the GPLv3 license that implements several perceptual hashing algorithms, and provides a C-like API to use those functions in your own programs. pHash itself is written in C++.

pHash 0.9.6 Released

04.23.2013 pHash 0.9.6 fixes some compilation errors and warnings, as well as updates to the automake files to support building on Gentoo.

That's great but what is it good for?

Potential applications include copyright protection, similarity search for media files, or even digital forensics. For example, YouTube could maintain a database of hashes that have been submitted by the major movie producers of movies to which they hold the copyright. If a user then uploads the same video to YouTube, the hash will be almost identical, and it can be flagged as a possible copyright violation. The audio hash could be used to automatically tag MP3 files with proper ID3 information, while the text hash could be used for plagiarism detection.

Have another use for pHash? Let us know!

Using

PHASH

To Classify Images


Using
PHASH
To Classify Images
These are NOT the same
but they are similar

PHASH is different than SHA256.
SHA256 makes a longer hash, but a very small change in the hash means a drastically different file.



SHA256:
84926feadda7dfeb59777ab0e4b4cc60a977b6e1



SHA256:
3b4cd30a1f1d85b28601641afde043751698 54f8

PHASH is different than SHA256.
SHA256 makes a longer hash, but a very small change in the hash means a drastically different file.

84926feadda7dfeb59777ab0e4b4cc60a977b6e1
3b4cd30a1f1d85b28601641afde043751698 54f8



SHA256:
84926feadda7dfeb59777ab0e4b4cc60a977b6e1

Levenshtein Distance

36



SHA256:
3b4cd30a1f1d85b28601641afde043751698 54f8

PHASH is shorter, but a difference in the hashes don't suggest a drastic change in the images.



PHASH:
aa95c1d5d595d485



PHASH:
aad595c1d595d590

PHASH is shorter, but a difference in the hashes don't suggest a drastic change in the images. Levenshtein distance can be applied to these shorter hashes with promising results.



aa95c1d5d595d485
aad595c1d595d590

PHASH:
aa95c1d5d595d485

Levenshtein Distance

7



PHASH:
aad595c1d595d590



These two images are obviously different, but they have some similarities. The PHASH's are different with a lev distance of 14

e59832669b9ac699

Levenshtein: 14



b3517399334ccccc

Showing multiple images and the lev distances



e59832669b9ac699

Levenshtein: 14



aa95c1d5d595d485

Levenshtein: 14

Levenshtein: 15

Levenshtein: 14

Levenshtein: 7



b3517399334ccccc

Levenshtein: 16



aad595c1d595d590

The images that look the most alike, but which are still different have a lev distance of 7. I can use this analysis to start setting a threshold.

Setting a Threshold



e59832669b9ac699



aa95c1d5d595d485

Levenshtein: 15

Levenshtein: 14

Levenshtein: 7



b3517399334ccccc

Levenshtein: 16



aad595c1d595d590

Now I can get back to removing non-relevant images in the malicious dataset. I'm going to group them using a threshold and delete non-relevant images as groups.

Grouping Images

Using the threshold

To demonstrate what grouping all the crawled screenshots looks like, I'll be taking a random bunch of screenshots like this:

Group 1

And group similar together.

Group 2

Enter you mailbox password to proceed.

Password

Enter you mailbox password to proceed.

Password

Remember me

Sign In

Group 3

signup-swellnetwork.net

Verify you are human by completing the action below.

I am human

signup-swellnetwork.net needs to review the security of your

advertisedszp.shop

Verify you are human by completing the action below.

Verify you are human

advertisedszp.shop needs to review the security of your connection

quialitsuzoxm.shop

Verify you are human by completing the action below.

Verify you are human

quialitsuzoxm.shop needs to review the security of your connection

Group 4

Outlook

Microsoft

Sign in

Next

Microsoft

Sign In

Email, phone, or Skype

Next

Group 5

DocuSign

Signature Required

Enter your work email

Group 6

amazon

Enter the characters you see below

Type the characters you see in this image:

PXMTBL

amazon

Enter the characters you see below

Type the characters you see in this image:

EHBUAN

Here's the initial process of grouping that I did using Python.
It just output a text file with the file locations that matched a group all together.
However, all images are in groups, including images that don't look like anything else. You can see that I have 1,507 groups.

```
Group 1:
  ../malicio
  ../malicio
  ../malicious dataset/urlscan_output_20240906_2335/cash67.com.jpg: 9a5ad69bea687848
  ../malicious dataset/urlscan_output_20240906_2335/getmoney3.com.jpg: 9a5ad69bea687848
  ../malicious dataset/urlscan_output_20240906_2335/www.findcash7.com.jpg: 9a5ad69bea687848
  ../malicious dataset/urlscan_output_20240906_2335/www.cash67.com.jpg: 9a5ad69bea687848
  ../malicious dataset/urlscan_output_20240906_2335/bigwealth7.com.cash67.com.jpg: 9a5ad69bea687848
  ../malicious dataset/urlscan_output_20240906_2335/www.getmoney3.com.cash67.com.jpg: 9a5ad69bea687848
  ../malicious dataset/urlscan_output_20240906_2335/www.onlinework7.com.jpg: 9a5ad69bea687848

Group 2:
  ../malicious dataset/urlscan_output_20240906_2335/fafafa0322.com:8989.jpg: f056d77125a08574

Group 3:
  ../malicious dataset
  ../malicious dataset
  ../malicious dataset
  ../malicious dataset

Group 4:
  ../malicious dataset
  ../malicious dataset
  ../malicious dataset
  ../malicious dataset
  ../malicious dataset
  ../malicious dataset
  ../malicious dataset
  ../malicious dataset
  ../malicious dataset
  ../malicious dataset
  ../malicious dataset
  ../malicious dataset
  ../malicious dataset
  ../malicious dataset/urlscan_output_20240906_2335/virginmoneyhelpchat.com.jpg: 97f0e00778f80f47
  ../malicious dataset/urlscan_output_20240906_2335/multicoinresolve.pages.dev.jpg: 97f0e00778f80f47
  ../malicious dataset/urlscan_output_20240906_2335/aib-mobileservices.com.jpg: 97f0e00778f80f47
  ../malicious dataset/urlscan_output_20240906_2335/palacecirwoos.shop.jpg: 97f0e00778f80f47
  ../malicious dataset/urlscan_output_20240906_2335/earn-cash204.pages.dev.jpg: 97f0e00778f80f47
  ../malicious dataset/urlscan_output_20240906_2335/easylifepro78.pages.dev.jpg: 97f0e00778f80f47
  ../malicious dataset/urlscan_output_20240906_2335/pdffilesinv.pages.dev.jpg: 97f0e00778f80f47
  ../malicious dataset/urlscan_output_20240906_2335/clickintowealth829.pages.dev.jpg: 97f0e00778f80f47
  ../malicious dataset/urlscan_output_20240906_2335/dollarnetcash1477.pages.dev.jpg: 97f0e00778f80f47
```

```
Group 1500: 1
Group 1501: 1
Group 1502: 1
Group 1503: 1
Group 1504: 1
Group 1505: 1
Group 1506: 1
Group 1507: 1
Total number of all items in the groups: 8666
```


recrawled_phishwarnings_output_2024090...
Name
The process is still going to be too tedious
I can search for each image in the grouped results text file, then delete them manually. I need a better/faster way
claim-hadiiah-dx
facebook.check-protect-a
zimbrahu.weebly.com.jpg
dollarboost56.pages.dev.jpg September 9, 2024 at 15:22 28 KB JPEG image
fixerrorslive.pages.dev.jpg September 9, 2024 at 15:22 31 KB JPEG image
netflix-clone-1p2.pages.dev.jpg September 9, 2024 at 15:21 28 KB JPEG image
cashnote384.pages.dev.jpg September 9, 2024 at 15:21 28 KB JPEG image
flight-booking-a-4dfdfs.pages.dev.jpg September 9, 2024 at 15:21 81 KB JPEG image
bitstamp-cw0.pages.dev.jpg September 9, 2024 at 15:21 28 KB JPEG image
cashinhand202.pages.dev.jpg 28 KB JPEG image
bdvinlinea-datosvencido.pages.dev.jpg 46 KB JPEG image
worknet24.pages.dev.jpg 28 KB JPEG image
3dhhtn.pages.dev.jpg 20 KB JPEG image
karaketherfi.pages.dev.jpg 43 KB JPEG image
ecash71.pages.dev.jpg 52 KB JPEG image
dollarsbox299.pages.dev.jpg 28 KB JPEG image
verifydappsync.pages.dev.jpg 44 KB JPEG image
smoot.tactior.buzz.jpg 4 bytes JPEG image
amazon-king-7a8f.hhil42729.workers.dev.jpg 22 KB JPEG image
dollarscareer255.pages.dev.jpg 52 KB JPEG image
worker-yellow-bird-8609.strumokvi.workers.dev.jp 72 KB JPEG image
earn-cash175.pages.dev.jpg 28 KB JPEG image
instantcash648.pages.dev.jpg 28 KB JPEG image
christianeshilohetj.pages.dev.jpg September 9, 2024 at 15:18 4 KB JPEG image
dollarprofitz18.pages.dev.jpg September 9, 2024 at 15:18 28 KB JPEG image
344444444-88887787877878-876453423.pages.dev.jpg September 9, 2024 at 15:17 14 KB JPEG image
dollarnetcash1021.pages.dev.jpg September 9, 2024 at 15:17 29 KB JPEG image
azlort.pages.dev.jpg September 9, 2024 at 15:17 22 KB JPEG image
analyticselevata.pages.dev.jpg September 9, 2024 at 15:17 17 KB JPEG image
dvgghjkjhgffg.pages.dev.jpg September 9, 2024 at 15:16 108 KB JPEG image
verifydapps...
Open with Preview
various Wallets issues on Secure Server.
This is not an app but a protocol that establishes a remote resolution between all noncustodial wallet.
Connect Wallet
1 of 4,158 selected, 33.63 GB available

The JavaScript library for bespoke data visualization

Create custom dynamic visualizations with unparalleled flexibility

Get started | What is D3? | Examples

I'm going to use D3 to make a visualization that allows me to quickly work with groups of images.



Grouping a small test set
I added a delete button.
The version in my code (at the end)
allows you to press ‘y’ or ’n’ to keep or delete the files from disk.



Now I can throw all the images in

Let’s build the malicious dataset!

The big circle is the most commonly seen similar images grouped together. Then, the other circles are groups.



I can click into each circle, hover over the individual circles, see the images, then delete the entire group if it's not a good screenshot.



Eventually, it's done and I'm left with a bunch of only malicious images!

Dataset is Populated!

Video showing a quick look at the images that are left.

Testing Detection

Now that the malicious dataset is available, I can start sending other screenshots
as they're crawled to be checked against the dataset, finding similar images, which indicate similar phishing campaigns.
But first, I am going to test with a small set of data.





For the test set, I'm using these two images. One is the 'malicious' one, and the other is from a URL that is similar. I want to see if, when crawled and compared, it identifies them as similar.

Different PHASH
Similar Look

I put one image into the malicious dataset.

Malicious Dataset

Upload ZIP File: Browse... No file selected. Upload

Thumbnail	URL	PHASH	A Record	City	Country
	attttt-104045.weeblysite.com	bd1f9f2d61c3c060	74.115.51.54	Unknown City	United States



Then, I tested two screenshots. The other one that's similar and another non-similar screenshot.

```
→  webcrawler git:(main) ✗ python test_screenshots_against_malicious_db.py
Matching images found:
Image: output_20240924_2202/centrum-100492.weeblysite.com.jpg, PHASH: b51f9e6061c3c5e1, S
imilar PHASH in DB: bd1f9f2d61c3c060
```

Crawl & Detect Test

Now I’m going to actually do a crawl of a few websites, testing against the malicious image.

I’ve got the URL for the similar-looking site along with the URL for the screenshot that’s already in the malicious dataset, and two other URLs which result in different screenshots.
The video in this slide demonstrated that only the original URL and the similar screenshot URL matched.



Visualizing Image Similarity Detection

Now I'm going to demonstrate various methods for visualizing detections
We typically are always looking at rows and columns (log files, SIEM results, etc).
I'm interested in exploring other ways to view 'hits'

Using a force-directed graph, we can view detections





And it can be customized to make more sense, like having the malicious reference screenshot bordered with a red line or whatever (security is creative)

Beyond Images

Images are good, but there's more to work with, and there are more technologies to experiment with

- **HTML Similarity**
- **OCR**
- **Using LLMs**
- **Text Content Similarity**

HTML Similarity

When crawling, I also get the html source. In the Levenshtein section, I showed that applying Levenshtein on the entire source is not going to be very productive, but there are options…

Showing the html source saved as a text file along with the screenshots



```
→ html_comparison_test
```



This video shows comparing two html files with ‘simhash’.
Simhash takes large amounts of text and makes a small hash out of it that is similar to PHASH. It also has a hamming function, which basically just uses Levenshtein to check the distance between the hashes. It’s effective though at finding files that have similar content.

This is a video showing text output of groups based off the html source code.
In the video, I search a few images that are listed within each group of html files that are similar and display the screenshots, showing that they look alike.



Malicious Item: DB: 9414069657275232887

Malicious Item: DB: 2255457264052142660

Malicious Item: DB: 9809154872125884965

Malicious Item: DB: 10898285367999205273

Malicious Item: DB: 14005425564567667930

Malicious Item: DB: 10610054991847526297

Malicious Item: DB: 15239755546223349657

2023-04 2023-05 2023-06 2023-07 2023-08 2023-09 2023-10 2023-11 2023-12 2024-01 2024-02 2024-03 2024-04 2024-05 2024-06 2024-07

Malicious Item: DB: 10610055000437428121

Legend: URL Count Colors
1-50 URLs

I need a better way to show the relationships between the html files, so I put them on a timeline. The timeline also can be useful to keep track of when certain kinds of phishing occurred

Scraping Text from Images

Optical Character Recognition (OCR)

Another method that can be used is to scrape the text from images and use that for similarity searching.

Here, I'm showing the text that has been scraped from the images:

Thumbnail	URL	Image PHASH	A Record	City	Country	Added	Text
	attmailaccount22.weebly.com	ed97960396496996	146.112.61.108	San Jose	United States	2024-10-25 06:23:54	ATT S ater Sign into access ATT Mail and Currentlyco m Indicates required field
	atdikg.taplink.ws	d7658c9a939a989c	146.112.61.108	San Jose	United States	2024-10-25 06:23:54	S ATT Signin to access ATT Mail and Currentlycom User ID Password
						5	a SS ATT Sign in to access ATT Mail and Currentlycom User ID Address 9
	internationaldomaierepresentationmainserstexts4.pages.dev	e59832669b9ac699	146.112.61.108	San Jose	United States	2024-10-28 05:57:30	Enter you mailbox password to proceed Remember me
	ionos-webmail-105551.weeblysite.com	f7732a98cc8ccca2	74.115.51.54	Unknown City	United States	2024-10-28 05:57:31	1ONOS webmail login Email Address Passwrd This form is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and
	papaya20688090.brizy.site	f5d320d88b7c8b2c	146.112.61.108	San Jose	United States	2024-10-28 05:57:32	VERIFICACION P Made With Brizy
	mail-105085.weeblysite.com	f77323331833cc8c	74.115.51.55	Unknown City	United States	2024-10-28 05:57:32	REAGAN Email Address Passwrd This form is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and apply

Comparing the html source and the OCR text, the OCR is a bit rough. But the html has more that you have to filter out.

009-288-49.weeblysite.com



OCR: ATT Q Sign in to access ATT Mail and Currentlycom User ID

HTML:
Home | 009-288-49
Shopping Cart
You don't have any items in your cart.
Checkout
Continue Shopping
Accepted here
Sign into access AT&T Mail andCurrently.com
This form is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
Sign in
Back to Cart
009-288-49
Secure checkout by Square

7txhjdncdblxdco3c.square.site

OCR: SS ATT Sign In to access ATT Mail and Currentlycom Email Passvvord

HTML:
Home | .
Shopping Cart
You don't have any items in your cart.
Checkout
Continue Shopping
Accepted here
Sign In
to access AT&T Mail andCurrently.com
You may receive marketing and promotional materials. Contact the merchant for their privacy practices. This reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.

Let’s try using LLM’s on text content (the html source to see if we can get something better than what we might get from OCR text)

Text Classification with LLMs
1. Easy mode

I’m going to send an entire html file and ask for a score to a locally hosted LLM that behaves much like ChatGPT (sending it via python)



```
⌥⌘4                    jpyorre@dievortex:~/Desktop/html_comparison_test

A juicy piece of HTML code!

As a cybersecurity expert, I'll analyze the content and provide a phishing likelihood score based on various factors.

**Phishing Likelihood Score: 6/10**

Here's why:

1. **Unusual path data**: The SVG path data contains unusual characters and formatting, which could be an attempt to obfuscate or hide malicious code.
2. **Multiple unknown classes**: Classes like `cko__footer-text`, `payment-methods`, and others are not well-known or widely used, which might indicate a custom-made phishing template.
3. **Unusual div nesting**: The HTML structure is complex, with multiple nested div elements that could be hiding malicious content or JavaScript code.
4. **Unknown script tags**: The presence of unknown s                                                    eckout/js/wcko.049619101192b0140d13.js"></script>`) coul
e the presence of malicious code.
5. **Lack of transparency**: The code does not provid                                                   og.

However, I must note that some of these factors might                                                  uld need to analyze the entire website, including the s
e code, network traffic, and user interactions.

**Recommendations:**

1. **Verify the website's authenticity**: Ensure you'                                                  familiar URLs, and legitimate branding.
2. **Be cautious with unknown scripts**: Avoid execut
3. **Use a reputable antivirus software**: Run regula                                                  bde.
```

The response is akin to a new analyst who is overly excited and under-experienced in this work

When I remove the superfluous text commentary to keep just the score and run it again, I get a different score. This LLM is too generalized and can’t produce consistent results.

I need to try using a more specific LLM

I’m going to demo zero-shot classification and a tool called OmniParser

Text Classification with LLMs

2. Better modes

Zero-Shot Classification

OmniParser



BART (large-sized model)

BART model pre-trained on English language. It was introduced in the paper BART: Denoising Sequence-to-Sequence Pre-training for Natural Language Generation, Translation, and Comprehension by Lewis et al. and first released in this repository.

This LLM uses something called zero-shot classification to see how much a blob of text looks like words I'm interested in

Model description

BART is a transformer encoder-decoder (seq2seq) model with a bidirectional (BERT like) encoder

BART is particularly effective when fine-tuned for text generation (e.g. summarization, translation) but also works well for comprehension tasks (e.g. text classification, question answering).

Zero-shot-classification

```
sequence_to_classify = "one day I will see the world"
candidate_labels = ['travel', 'cooking', 'dancing']
classifier(sequence_to_classify, candidate_labels)
#{'labels': ['travel', 'dancing', 'cooking'],
# 'scores': [0.9938651323318481, 0.0032737774308770895, 0.0028610343579202891],
# 'sequence': 'one day I will see the world'}
```

This demo, from hugging face shows three keywords (‘travel’, ‘cooking’, ‘dancing’). It receives a sentence (‘one day I will see the world’) and then it analyzes the text, resulting in a score for each keyword. The score represents how close the text is to each keyword.

For my test, I gave it 5 keywords. They aren't super specific, but just to use against any text I send to it. You can change this in the code (at end of presentation)

```python
# Load the zero-shot classification model
classifier = pipeline('zero-shot-classification', model='facebook/bart-large-mnli', device=device)
labels = ["login", "banking", "security", "phishing", "phone"]

# Define request body model
class TextData(BaseModel):
    text: str

# Route to classify text
@router.post("/classify")
async def classify_text(data: TextData):
    classified_data = classifier(data.text, labels)
    return {"labels": classified_data["labels"], "scores": classified_data["scores"]}
```

Zero-shot-classification results

```
'OCR text': 'VERIFICACION ss ',

'login': 0.6300058364868164
'phone': 0.2010927051305771
'banking': 0.10679445415735245
'phishing': 0.015628859400749207

'date_added': '2024-10-16T06:26:55.021364'
'phash': 'f5d320d88b7c8b2c'
'a_record': '146.112.61.108'
'city': 'San Jose'
'country': 'United States'
'url': 'papaya20688090.brizy.site'
```

009-288-49.weeblysite.com



Here, I'm seeing a comparison of how close the html source and the OCR text of this phishing page is to each of my specified keywords

OCR Classification:

login: 0.8000938296318054
security: 0.1210165098309516 9
phone: 0.05189700424671173
banking: 0.016330692917108536
phishing: 0.010662009939551353

HTML Source Classification:

login: 0.8146952986717224
security: 0.09933193027973175
phone: 0.053744859993457794
banking: 0.017227377742528915
phishing: 0.015000510029494762

I want a better text scraping method. Thankfully, I found an LLM just for this.

Parsing the UI

And getting better OCR Results

README | Code of conduct | CC-BY-4.0 license | Security

OmniParser: Screen Parsing tool for Pure Vision Based GUI Agent

Microsoft released an LLM that finds user interface elements of a screenshot. I set it up as a fast-api service that I can call from my web app.

Paper | License MIT

[Project Page] [Blog Post] [Models]

OmniParser is a comprehensive method for parsing user interface screenshots into structured and easy-to-understand elements, which significantly enhances the ability of GPT-4V to generate actions that can be accurately grounded in the corresponding regions of the interface.

microsoft / OmniParser | like 897 | Follow Microsoft 4,502

Image-Text-to-Text | Transformers | Safetensors | blip-2 | visual-question-answering | Inference Endpoi

Model card | Files and versions | Community 12

[Project Page] [Blog Post] [Demo]

Model Summary

OmniParser is a general screen parsing tool, which interprets/converts UI screenshot to structured format, to improve existing LLM based UI agent. Training Datasets include: 1) an interactable icon detection dataset, which was curated from popular web pages and automatically annotated to highlight clickable and actionable regions, and 2) an icon description dataset, designed to associate each UI element with its corresponding function.

This model hub includes a finetuned version of YOLOv8 and a finetuned BLIP-2 model on the above dataset respectively. For more details of the models used and finetuning, please refer to the paper.

This is OmniParsers demo of how this works. You upload an image (left) and get a result (right).



Let’s compare plain OCR vs OmniParser Classification.

URL	OCR text	OmniParse	Notable Differences
attmailaccount22.weebly.com	login (0.551) security (0.262) phone (0.115)	login (0.667) phone (0.226) security (0.070)	Higher login and phone scores in OmniParse
atdikg.taplink.ws	login (0.706) security (0.206) phone (0.058)	login (0.574) security (0.236) phone (0.162)	Lower login, higher security and phone in OmniParse
att-mail-109459.weeblysite.com	login (0.641) security (0.263) phone (0.062)	login (0.638) phone (0.171) security (0.163)	Similar login, higher phone and security in OmniParse

Text similarity from the OCR text



Showing text similarity of scraped text on a timeline (timeline shows the screenshot, but is grouped from the OCR text)

Research

Campaigns over Time

I started building this as an inline detection tool, but it actually might have more use in researching phishing campaigns.



Looking at activity of specific phishing campaigns over a time period

Another portion of the interface and process is to send alerts to a SIEM or some system. I chose Elasticsearch and Kibana

Alerting



Taking Action

If using for detection, you're probably going to take some sort of action when a new phishing page is seen

With alerts going to your SIEM, it's easy to automate the blocking process



And that action is typically to block the domain or URL



The next several slides will show various aspects of the interface at the time these slides were created (the code is still in development, so it might change in the future)

Current Version of Interface

Detections page

Current Detections

Added	Image PHASH	URL	A Record	Location	Extracted Text	Classification	HTML Source Simhash
2024-07-09 22:13:34	 b86fc59090c73b3a	rackspace1883999400488599 5.weebly.com	146.112.61.108	San Jose, United States	 Webmail Login SUSPICIOUS Email address EMAIL Learn to quickly identify and report P@ssword A	**login:** 0.45 **phishing:** 0.37 **security:** 0.17 **banking:** 0.01 **phone:** 0.00	10337228898236707554
2024-01-11 00:42:47	 f464239a99999b39	my-site-101155.weeblysite.com	146.112.61.108	San Jose, United States	 A6B Q BJIE3TE, 3A AA IPObJD+KUTE ABB norpe6uren * Hapona This form is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.	**security:** 0.76 **login:** 0.10 **phone:** 0.08 **phishing:** 0.03 **banking:** 0.02	9931658834035383472
2024-07-02 21:04:28	 e59832669b9ac699	inshaoiuyfldtcfyguijiodowiuhmkjnbhvgcfdxsedrftgyuhjlkopoiu.pages.dev	146.112.61.108	San Jose, United States	 Enter you mailbox password to proceed. Password Remember me Sign In	**security:** 0.64 **login:** 0.30 **phone:** 0.02 **banking:** 0.02 **phishing:** 0.02	1442362639392064642
2024-02-08 16:02:53	 f777cc883164c998	worker-home-att-767e.rijolo7229.workers.dev	146.112.61.108	San Jose, United States	 AT&T Sign In to access AT&T Mail and Currently.com User ID Forgot user ID? Password	**login:** 0.51 **security:** 0.33 **phone:** 0.13 **phishing:** 0.02 **banking:** 0.01	3930323897056612998
2024-07-05 12:10:01	 b7f58c8c603333d8	wefvbjhwevbhiwcdghwghiwerhrfhghbvhcdvd.weebly.com	146.112.61.108	San Jose, United States	 SNetZero* Welcome! Please sign-in below. * Indicates required field Email * Passvvord *	**login:** 0.82 **security:** 0.12 **phishing:** 0.02 **phone:** 0.02 **banking:** 0.02	9944788745945115358

HOME | UPLOAD GEO URLS | CURRENT GEO ENTRIES | MALICIOUS DATASET | CURRENT DETECTIONS | DISCOVERY | DOCUMENTATION

Malicious Dataset

Hovering over an OmniParser result screenshot

Upload

Added	Image PHASH	URL	A Record	Location	Extracted Text	Classified Data	HTML Source Simhash
2024-11-07 09:07:42	e59832669b9ac699	internationaldomainerepresе				security: 0.64 login: 0.30 phone: 0.02 banking: 0.02 phishing: 0.02	1442362639392064642
2024-11-07 09:07:43	f7732a98cc8ccca2	ionos-webmail-105551.wee				security: 0.58 login: 0.39 phishing: 0.02 phone: 0.01 banking: 0.01	3024539918263099024
2024-11-07 09:07:43	f5d320d88b7c8b2c	papaya20688090.brizy.site				security: 0.51 login: 0.39 phone: 0.05 phishing: 0.04 banking: 0.02	1949342313809748612
2024-11-07 09:07:44	f77323331833cc8c	mail-105085.weeblysite.com	74.115.51.55	Unknown City, United States	REAGAN Email Address * Passw*rd * This form is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply. Log In	security: 0.81 login: 0.16 phishing: 0.02 phone: 0.01 banking: 0.01	31607034338176278825
2024-11-07 09:07:45		mazulyta.pages.dev	146.112.61.108	San Jose, United States		login: 0.84 security: 0.11 phishing: 0.03	6441788642322681002



DEEPSEC

HOME | UPLOAD GEO URLS | CURRENT GEO ENTRIES | MALICIOUS DATASET | CURRENT DETECTIONS | DISCOVERY | DOCUMENTATION

Hovering over the html

Malicious Dataset

Upload ZIP File: Choose File No file chosen Upload

Added	Image PHASH	URL	A Record	Location	Extracted Text	Classified Data	HTML Source Simhash
2024-11-07 09:07:42	 e59832669b9ac699	internationaldomainerepresentationmainserstexts4.pages.dev	146.112.61.108	San Jose, United States	 Enter passwo Passwo m	**security:** 0.64	14423826393920664642
2024-11-07 09:07:43	 f7732a98cc8ccca2	ionos-webmail-105551.weeblysite.com	74.115.51.54	Unknown City, United States	 1&1 IO login E- Passw is pr reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and		5399182630990024
2024-11-07 09:07:43	 f5d320d88b7c8b2c	papaya20688090.brizy.site	146.112.61.108	San Jose, United States	 VERIFICACION Email: User name:. Password: Submit - Made With Brizye	**security:** 0.51 **login:** 0.39 **phone:** 0.05 **phishing:** 0.04 **banking:** 0.02	194934231380974861 2
2024-11-07 09:07:44	 f77323331833cc8c	mail-105085.weeblysite.com	74.115.51.55	Unknown City, United States	 REAGAN Email Address * Passw"rd * This form is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply. Log In	**security:** 0.81 **login:** 0.16 **phishing:** 0.02 **phone:** 0.01 **banking:** 0.01	31607043381762782 5

HOME | UPLOAD GEO URLS | CURRENT GEO ENTRIES | MALICIOUS DATASET | CURRENT DETECTIONS | DISCOVERY | DOCUMENTATION

PHASH Detections

PHASH Threshold: 8 Modify Threshold

Orange Circles are overlapping items
Click to expand

1-50 URLs

Malicious Item: DB: e59832669b9ac699

2024-03 2024-04 2024-05 2024-06 2024-07

Malicious Item: DB: f7732a98cc8ccca2

2023-06 2023-07 2023-08 2023-09 2023-10 2023-11 2023-12 2024-01 2024-02 2024-03 2024-04 2024-05 2024-06 2024-07 2024-08 2024-09

Malicious Item: DB: f5d320d88b7c8b2c

2023-08 2023-09 2023-10 2023-11 2023-12 2024-01 2024-02 2024-03 2024-04 2024-05 2024-06 2024-07

Malicious Item: DB: f77323331833cc8c

2023-04 2023-05 2023-06 2023-07 2023-08 2023-09 2023-10 2023-11 2023-12 2024-01 2024-02 2024-03 2024-04 2024-05 2024-06 2024-07 2024-08 2024-09

Malicious Item: DB: f5c70ae627d022d5

Timeline based off screenshot similarities

Malicious Item: DB: f7558888dd992633

2024-03 2024-04 2024-05 2024-06 2024-07 2024-08 2024-09

Malicious Item: DB: bcc3c31c926d6d92

2023-02 2023-03 2023-04 2023-05 2023-06 2023-07 2023-08 2023-09 2023-10 2023-11 2023-12 2024-01 2024-02 2024-03 2024-04 2024-05 2024-06 2024-07 2024-08

https://gitlab.pyosec.com

Write drunk

Sign in

Josh Pyorre / detecting-phishing-with-similarity-searching

D **detecting-phishing-with-similarity-searching**

☆ Star 0

main | detecting-phishing-with-similarity-searching | History | Find file | Code

Code cleanup
Josh Pyorre authored 5 minutes ago — 874cdd76

Name	Last commit	Last update
LLMs	Code cleanup	5 minutes ago
client_scripts	Code cleanup	5 minutes ago
feed_analysis_utilities	Code cleanup	5 minutes ago
web_apps	Code cleanup	5 minutes ago
webcrawler	Code cleanup	5 minutes ago
.gitignore	Cleaning things up for release	40 minutes ago
readme.md	Code cleanup	5 minutes ago

Project information

137 Commits
1 Branch
0 Tags

README
Auto DevOps enabled

Created on
September 21, 2024

readme.md

This repository contains code created as part of work on detecting phishing using visual similarity.

Note: this is a work in progress. I will continue working on streamlining everything so it's easier to run.

revise sober

Here's the code!

Grab the crawlers and crawl things,
of the LLMs,
or the Levenstein searching,
or the visualizations,
or the cool skulls that are used in the maps,
or everything!

Detecting Phishing using Visual Similarity

https://gitlab.pyosec.com/

Thank you!

Find me:

pyosec.com

bsky.app/profile/joshpyorre.bsky.social

infosec.exchange/@joshpyorre

Music (dark electronic): dievortex.com

DIE VORTEX